

**United States Sailing Association Independent Review Panel Inquiry into the Fatal Accident
Involving *Uncontrollable Urge* During the 2013 Islands Race on
8 March 2013**

Written By: John Jourdane, Betty Sherman, Bill Stump, and Dave Ullman

Technical Support:

Chuck Hawley, Dr. Stephen Shea, and Jim Wildey

Special thanks to: Bouyweather for the weather report

Table of Contents

US Sailing Overview:	4
Objective:	4
Synopsis:	4
Factual Information:	4
Panel Findings:	8
Recommendations:	9
Analysis:	11
Communication Issues:	11
Other Race Boats Offering Assistance:	11
Rudder Issues:	12
Safety Gear Issues:	13
Anchors:	13
Life Raft:	14
Auto inflating Safety Harnesses:	14
Flares:	15
Physical State of Crew:	15
Background Information:	16
The Crew:	16
Columbia 32C Specifications:	17
Race Management:	18
Responses from other Competitors:	20
Findings by Dr. Stephen Shea, M.D.:	23
Appendix 1: Members of US Sailing Independent Inquiry Panel 2013 Islands Race	23
Appendix 2: Notice of Race:	24
Appendix 3: Sailing Instructions:	27
Appendix 4: USCG Event Permits:	32
Appendix 5: Weather Data:	36

Appendix 6: *Uncontrollable Urge* Safety Equipment: 68

Appendix 7: *Uncontrollable Urge* chart plots: 71

Appendix 8: Photos of *Uncontrollable Urge* on San Clemente Island: 77

Appendix 9: Crew Interviews: 81

Appendix 10: Designer Interview 100

Appendix 11: John Jourdane’s Sydney-Hobart Rescue Report..... 102

Appendix 12: Disposition of the Crew’s Life Jackets and Tethers..... 104

Appendix 13: USCG Report 104

Appendix 14: Survey Results 113

Appendix 15: Interview with Phillip Infelise, Owner/Skipper of *Mile High Klub* 120

US Sailing Independent Review Panel – 2013 Islands Race Accident

US Sailing Overview:

US Sailing is the national organizing body for the sport of sailing and is the overall authority for sanctioning sailboat races in the United States. US Sailing follows established policies of reviewing races involving causalities and/or fatalities that commenced with the 1979 Fastnet Race Report in Great Britain. The authorities for the 1988 Sydney Hobart Race Report in Australia and the 2009 Flinders Islet Race Report (Cruising Yacht Club of Australia) continued this effort.

In 2011 US Sailing Independent Panels reviewed three accidents beginning with a fatal accident in the Severn River (Severn Sailing Association); the fatal accident in the Chicago to Mackinac Race (*WingNuts*) and the keel failure and capsize in the Fastnet Race (*Rambler 100*). Accidents reviewed in 2012 included the fatal accident in the Fully Crewed Farallones Race (*Low Speed Chase*) and the fatal accident in the Newport to Ensenada Race (*Aegean*). The reviews offer insight for race organizers and sailors of the facts involved in each of these events and offer suggestions to avoid and/or mitigate similar outcomes.

In 2013 US Sailing appointed a panel to review the fatal accident that happened during the 2013 Islands Race.

Objective:

This report was created as a result of an accident that occurred during the 2013 Islands Race when the vessel, *Uncontrollable Urge*, lost her rudder and drifted onto the shore of San Clemente Island resulting in the loss of one life. The objective of this report is to determine the facts pertaining to the accident and identify recommendations to reduce the chance of future similar tragedies. This report is not intended to be used in any judicial proceedings whose purpose is to attribute or apportion liability or blame. The panel members who contributed to this investigation and report are listed in Appendix 1.

Synopsis:

During the 2013 Islands Race, *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia Carbon 32 sailboat, lost its rudder, and drifted onto San Clemente Island 2 ½ hours later. One crew member was drowned when the drifting boat was rolled and the crew was forced to abandon the vessel. The United States Coast Guard and other boats participating in the race offered assistance, but were initially told by *Uncontrollable Urge* that assistance was not needed. This report addresses issues regarding rudder failures, communication, other boats offering assistance, and safety gear.

Factual Information:

The 2013 Islands Race started on 8 March 2013. The course was from the start inside the Los Angeles breakwater to the west end of Catalina Island which was taken to port, then to the northwest end of San Clemente Island which was taken to port, and then to the finish off of San Diego Buoy #1. *Uncontrollable Urge* was one of 39 boats in the fleet. The Organizing Authorities for the race were Newport Harbor Yacht Club who

started the race, and San Diego Yacht Club who finished the race. (See Appendices 2, 3, and 4 for the Notice of Race, Sailing Instructions, and USCG Event Permits.)



(See Appendix 7 for additional chart plots)

Uncontrollable Urge was a new carbon fiber composite Columbia Carbon 32 which had not sailed in an offshore race before the Islands Race. (See Appendix 6 for a list of safety equipment aboard the boat.)

There were six people onboard *Uncontrollable Urge*: James Gilmore, Skipper; Mike Skillicorn, a long time *Uncontrollable Urge* crew member; Craig Williams, owner of Olson 40 *Uproarious*; Ryan Georgianna, a long time crew member on *Uproarious*; Vince Valdes, owner of Columbia Yachts; and Doug Pajak, a lifelong surfer and sailor. Prior to the race Gilmore had sprained his ankle and hurt his shoulder. Because of his injuries he acted as the navigator and mostly stayed in the navigation station below decks.

The following information regarding the sequence of events leading to the accident is based on interviews with surviving crew members and VHF audio files provided by the USCG.

Uncontrollable Urge lost her rudder at about 2130 on the night of 8 March 2013 during the Islands Race. The wind direction was WNW/NW with a wind speed of 25-28 knots with higher gusts. There was a mixed swell with the WNW swell being 6 to 8 feet and potentially up to 10 feet. The sea surface temperature was between 55-57 degrees. The new moon was on 11 March 2013 so there was no light from the moon. (See Appendix 5 for the Buoy Weather Report)

Uncontrollable Urge's rudder broke when she was approximately 2 miles from the closest point of San Clemente Island. Gilmore immediately contacted the United States Coast Guard (USCG) on VHF 16 and informed them of the boat's situation. The USCG asked if they were in immediate danger and Gilmore said no. The USCG told Gilmore to activate the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) and he did so.

Two other race boats initially spoke to Gilmore on the VHF: *Innocent Merriment* and *Transformer*. *Innocent Merriment* is a 53'J-160 and her position at the time of the *Uncontrollable Urge's* rudder failure was approximately 12 miles downwind of *Uncontrollable Urge's* position. *Transformer* is a 52' Beneteau Oceanis and she was between 1 to 1 ½ miles away from *Uncontrollable Urge's* position. Both boats offered assistance.

Additionally there were three other race boats near *Uncontrollable Urge's* position that were not in communication and therefore did not offer assistance: *Dorade*, *Aimante de Fille*, and *Adios*.

Given the wind and sea conditions it would have taken *Innocent Merriment* a considerable amount of time to go upwind to *Uncontrollable Urge's* position. As *Transformer* was the closer boat they offered to stand by to ascertain if they could help *Uncontrollable Urge*. Gilmore told *Transformer* that they did not need assistance and *Transformer* continued racing.

While Gilmore was communicating with the USCG and other race boats, the crew took the mainsail down and set the storm trysail. Before the rudder broke they had been sailing with a double reefed main and a #1 jib. After the rudder broke with the #1 jib set the boat was not balanced, so they changed to the smaller #3 jib and were making 1-1 ½ knots of boat speed. The #3 jib failed due to the high winds and they stopped trying to sail and used the engine.

They next tried to fashion an emergency rudder from a bunk board hung over the transom. The bunk board snapped and broke. At the same time the crew deployed two anchors from the bow, even though the 200 feet of rode would not have reached the bottom. Their idea was that the anchors would keep the bow into the main wave train.

After deploying the anchors and with the engine running the crew tried dragging buckets off the stern to steer which did not work.

During this time Gilmore asked the USCG if it was possible for Sea Tow to come to their assistance. The USCG told him the response time would be 20 hours.

After the USCG told Gilmore that Sea Tow would not be able to respond in a timely manner, they asked him if anyone else could assist *Uncontrollable Urge* to the east (leeward) side of San Clemente Island or to any harbor. Gilmore then hailed any Islands Race boat on VHF 16. *Innocent Merriment*, *X-pletive* and another boat replied to the hail. *X-pletive* took *Uncontrollable Urge's* position and immediately asked "How far off the Island are you?" At this time the USCG asked Gilmore to switch to VHF 22a. When he did so *Uncontrollable Urge* and *X-pletive* were no longer in communication. *X-pletive's* position at this time was approximately seven miles downwind from the position of *Uncontrollable Urge*.

A second emergency rudder was tried using the boom lashed to the tiller with a carbon fiber battery hatch attached and extending over the transom. This proved too dangerous as the boom swung wildly through the cockpit and eventually hit one crew member in the nose.

When *Uncontrollable Urge* drifted to within about ½ mile of San Clemente Island with the anchors dragging from the bow, the crew first spotted the surf line. Two crew members went forward to the bow and tried kedging using the engine at full throttle and pulling on the anchor rode. This was too hard as the swells were getting larger hitting the boat on the bow.

The crew cleared all of the lines and loose gear from the deck and prepared to be swept onto the shore. Most of the crew had inflated their life jackets by this time. Gilmore told the USCG they were about to abandon ship. The USCG told him to get the hand held VHF radio. He took the VHF radio from the man overboard bag (MOB) bag and left the cabin as he was afraid of being trapped below.

Uncontrollable Urge had a ditch bag that was to be used in the event the crew had to abandon ship. In addition, there was a man overboard bag that was stocked with similar items that was to be thrown to a person who had fallen overboard (Appendix 6). The MOB bag was left in the cabin.

The life raft was located in a dedicated compartment in the transom with a painter attached. When the crew deployed the raft it was swept overboard until it was at the end of its painter and the ballast bags filled. The painter was quite long and two crew members were unable to pull the raft back to the boat. As they tried to pull the raft back the boat was periodically hitting the bottom.

Williams spotted a large wave and said “I think this one is going to roll us”. The large wave rolled the boat past 90 degrees and the rig broke. The life raft painter broke and the ditch bag which had been on deck was lost overboard. The EPIRB in the ditch bag was activated and began transmitting.

Gilmore and Pajak were washed out of the boat as it righted, and Georgianna pulled the quick release on his harness. He was washed clear of the boat and debris. Valdes, Skillicorn, and Williams remained with the boat. Williams had washed overboard to the end of his tether on the starboard, down swell side of the boat, and was tangled up in the mast and rigging. At first Valdes and Skillicorn thought they were the only two left aboard.

Valdes spotted Williams’ tether on the starboard side and realized that Williams was still attached. He was not able to pull Williams back aboard because Williams was caught in his tether and the wreckage of the mast. The swells were hitting the boat on the bow and port side and washing over the entire deck. Skillicorn had inhaled water and was unable to help. Valdes cut Williams’ tether. As Williams was conscious and able to yell, Valdes told him to swim ashore.

Gilmore and Georgianna had made it to shore and were huddled together to keep each other warm. Pajak had found the life raft in the surf, had gotten in the raft, and rode it to shore. When Pajak arrived on the beach he went looking for other crew members. He saw Williams’ life jacket light and swam out to him. He appeared to be unconscious. Pajak started CPR in the surf and brought Williams ashore. He continued CPR onshore, but finally realized that Williams was deceased.

During this time Valdes and Skillicorn were still on the boat slowly progressing towards the shore as the waves were breaking over the boat. The boat was breaking up and filling with water. There were two large flat fenders onboard. They used one of these flat fenders as a kickboard and locked arms to swim ashore.

When Valdes came ashore his legs were so cramped from the cold that he was not able to walk. The crew used the raft as a shelter from the wind and cold. Everyone except Pajak showed signs of hypothermia.

When the USCG helicopter arrived on the scene Georgianna ignited two flares from the raft ditch bag to alert the USCG of their position on the beach. A USCG rescue swimmer was lowered from the helicopter. He and Pajak evacuated the crew and Williams' body from the beach using the rescue basket. The flight from San Clemente Island to San Diego took 40 minutes. Ambulances were waiting at the tarmac. Most of the crew's body temperatures were 94 degrees when they arrived in San Diego. Pajak stayed at the USCG station and spoke with the San Diego Coroner. Trauma counseling was provided by City of San Diego.

The total time from the rudder failure to the boat coming ashore on the beach was 2 ½ hours.

Panel Findings:

1. The accident was caused by the failure of the vessel's rudder while sailing off a lee shore.
2. The emergency rudder preparations on *Uncontrollable Urge* were not adequate for the conditions in which the original rudder failed, despite the efforts of the crew.
3. The Panel believes that if the skipper of *Uncontrollable Urge* told the USCG they were in distress initially when the rudder broke the USCG would have responded by sending help immediately. Even if assistance from the USCG was not needed it would have increased their options for rescue.
4. Help from the race boats would have given *Uncontrollable Urge* additional options for rescue.
5. The flight time for the USCG the night of the Islands Race was 50 minutes for the helicopter to be on the scene and another 60 minutes to ready hoist operations and pull the crew to safety. Before the USCG arrived the crew of *Uncontrollable Urge* had to be self-sufficient.
6. By the time the skipper of *Uncontrollable Urge* asked for assistance from other racers the vessel was one mile from the shore. Other race boats that could have responded with assistance were a considerable distance downwind and it is unlikely that those vessels would have been able assist *Uncontrollable Urge* due to her proximity to the lee shore.
7. The course of *Uncontrollable Urge* after the rudder failure was almost entirely dictated by the wind and swell direction. Her position was always moving towards the Island.
8. None of the emergency steering methods tried by the crew of *Uncontrollable Urge* worked in the conditions. The requirement of OSR 4.15.1 b) is "crews must be aware of alternative methods of steering the yacht in any sea condition in the event of rudder loss. At least one method must have been proven to work on board the yacht". The crew of *Uncontrollable Urge* assumed that since they had success steering Columbia 32C hull #1 off of Newport Beach, California in 10 knots of wind using

just the sails they would be able to steer *Uncontrollable Urge* in the conditions they found off of San Clemente Island during the Islands Race.

9. The crew of *Uncontrollable Urge* found that even with the engine at full throttle none of the emergency steering measures gave them enough directional stability to counteract the leeway generated by the large sea state. If no methods of emergency steering have been tried prior to a rudder failure there is no way to know if the emergency steering method will work in any sea condition.
10. Four of five Spinlock deck vests failed to work properly, allowing the flotation chamber to pull over the wearer's head to one side of the body. The deceased was found floating face down with the flotation chamber pulled over his head. Given that the crew had to swim through large surf to reach the shore this was a life threatening failure.
11. OSR Category 3 is defined as "Races across open water, most of which is relatively protected or close to shorelines". The US Sailing prescribes "that Category 2 races are of extended duration along or not far removed from shorelines, where a high degree of self-sufficiency is required of yachts but with the reasonable probability that outside assistance would be available for aid in the event of serious emergencies". While the Islands Race has a rated distance of 129.5 nautical miles the northwest corner of San Clemente Island is 75 miles from San Diego Buoy #1 and therefore in inclement conditions help is not readily available.

Recommendations:

1. Vessels that race offshore should have adequate rudders so that heavy weather sailing conditions do not cause them to break. This may require plan approval or an inspection from a naval architect or marine surveyor.
2. Crews should be aware of how to contact the Coast Guard or other vessels and to indicate the amount of assistance required. The US Sailing Safety at Sea Course should address how to communicate clearly with the USCG and other race vessels in case of distress. A broken rudder should be considered an emergency situation in heavy seas and high winds. Specifically, sailors should understand when a Mayday or PAN PAN urgency transmission is justified. Crews must be realistic about their level of danger.
3. US Sailing should recommend that all race boats post near the VHF clear directions on how to communicate when the vessel is in distress. Some VHF instruction manuals have specific language on how to communicate when the vessel is in distress that skippers and crews should read.
4. Skippers and crews need to be aware of methods of rendering assistance to other vessels, including providing skills and advice, providing tools, acting as a communications relay, towing, and transfer of crews.
5. When sailors are in a life threatening situation, they should seek and pursue all possible options for assistance, including accepting assistance from other vessels.

6. The US Sailing Safety at Sea Committee should recommend that the Offshore Special Regulations Category 0, 1, and 2 replace **4.15.1 b) “crews must be aware of alternative methods of steering the yacht in any sea condition in the event of rudder loss. At least one method must have been proven to work on board the yacht. An inspector may require that this method be demonstrated”** with language that states yacht’s emergency steering shall be constructed to the same or greater strength standard as required for the yacht’s primary steering and that can be deployed in any weather condition.
7. Organizing Authorities of offshore races could offer the option to boat owners to submit a video of their emergency rudder deployment on their boat in lieu of OSR 4.15.1 b) “An inspector may require that this method be demonstrated”. A video of the man overboard practice could also be required.
8. Safety tethers need a quick release that will work in any condition. The cutter, knife, or shackle that requires both hands to release is not a viable option.

9. Several crewmembers experienced problems when the inflation chamber of the life jacket was pushed over their heads, causing asymmetrical buoyancy. The panel recommends that Spinlock and other manufacturers examine the design of their inflating vests and consider making the inflation chamber more secure to the harness.
10. The Organizing Authorities for the Islands Race, Newport Harbor Yacht Club and San Diego Yacht Club should designate the Islands Race as an OSR Category 2 race.

Analysis:

Communication Issues:

The failure of the rudder was the initial event that caused a series of cascading failures. Gilmore immediately called the USCG on VHF 16. For unknown reasons Gilmore did not adequately describe the seriousness of *Uncontrollable Urge's* situation to the USCG. Because they were not aware of the perilous situation, the USCG did not notify the rescue authorities on Catalina Island. Additionally, the fire detail on San Clemente Island was not able to locate the position of the *Uncontrollable Urge* crew from the information they were given by the USCG (Appendix 13 USCG Reports). Because crew members on deck were not always aware of what Gilmore, below deck, was communicating to the USCG none of the other crew members recognized that the seriousness of their condition had not been adequately communicated to the USCG.

Gilmore gave the USCG his Sea Tow account number thinking that Sea Tow would respond from Avalon, approximately 25 miles away. However, Sea Tow does not operate out of Avalon; they operate out of Newport Beach which was 51 miles away or San Diego which was 75 miles away. Vessel Assist is the independent rescue franchise in Catalina. Because the USCG was not aware of the perilous situation, they never notified Gilmore that there were no Sea Tow assets in Catalina; only that it would take Sea Tow 20 hours to respond.

Uncontrollable Urge's position at the time of the rudder failure was approximately 25 miles southwest from Avalon. Given that any rescue vessel would have had to motor with swells and wind on the beam it would have taken a rescue vessel a considerable amount of time to respond. However, there are rescue assets in Avalon who would have responded had they been notified by the USCG.

The distance from where *Uncontrollable Urge* initially lost her rudder to San Diego Buoy #1 is approximately 75 miles. The USCG helicopter from the San Diego station took 50 minutes to get to the crew when they were ashore. As it took 2 ½ hours for the boat to come ashore, it was critical for help to arrive within the first hour before the boat entered the larger swells and surf closer to the shore line.

While Gilmore was below decks communicating to the USCG, the crew was trying to manufacture a method of steering the boat. It is unclear if Gilmore communicated to the crew regarding the boat's proximity to the shore of the island.

Other Race Boats Offering Assistance:

Two boats, *Innocent Merriment* and *Transformer*, initially spoke to Gilmore on VHF 16. *Innocent Merriment* was not in a position to readily assist *Uncontrollable Urge*. *Transformer* was the closest boat and they offered to stand by to ascertain if they could help.

Additionally there were three other race boats near *Uncontrollable Urge's* position. *Dorade*, *Aimante de Fille*, and *Adios* were all in close proximity, but they apparently did not hear Gilmore on the VHF.

Had *Transformer* been asked to give assistance they could have attempted to take the crew off *Uncontrollable Urge* and then tried to save the boat if that was possible (Appendix 11). After two offers to stand by, Gilmore told *Transformer* that *Uncontrollable Urge* did not need assistance. He was worried about the rigs of the boats hitting in the large confused seas. In the wind and seas the boats were experiencing he was also concerned about the safety of the crew on *Transformer*, should they have assisted.

While taking the crew off *Uncontrollable Urge* would have been difficult, there is precedent for race boats assisting other race boats by taking the other's crew aboard. This was done in a Sydney-Hobart Race when two race boats stopped racing and came to assist a sinking boat. The sinking vessel floated their life raft to an assisting boat and rescued the crew.

Another option would have been for *Transformer* to float a tow line to *Uncontrollable Urge* to give them steerage. The engine on *Uncontrollable Urge* was still functional and had another boat given them steerage it could have prevented the boat from going ashore. The Panel does not mean to suggest that another race boat could have towed *Uncontrollable Urge* to a safe harbor, but another race boat could have pulled them from the lee shore until rescue services or other solutions materialized.

For the crew of *Uncontrollable Urge* to have availed themselves of any rescue options from *Transformer* or any other race boat they needed ask for assistance immediately to avoid placing both boats in danger of drifting onto San Clemente Island.

When *Uncontrollable Urge* was about one mile offshore they hailed any Islands Race boat on VHF 16. When *X-pletive* responded they were about 7 miles ahead of *Uncontrollable Urge's* position. *Uncontrollable Urge* changed radio frequencies at the request of the USCG and nothing more was heard from *X-pletive*.

Rudder Issues:

The 2013 Islands Race was ISAF OSR Category 3 with Life Raft. There is no plan review required for OSR Category 3.

Tim Kernan, the designer of the Columbia 32, stated "The design of the rudder for the 32 is a standard hollow rhomboid post, well above ABS requirements". (Appendix 10) While sailing in 10 knots of wind off Newport Beach, California Columbia 32 hull #1 broke her rudder with an A2 set. As Gilmore intended to sail *Uncontrollable Urge* in Transpac and other offshore races he was concerned about the rudder post strength.

Builder, Vince Valdes, built the rudder for *Uncontrollable Urge* with a solid post instead of the Kernan designed hollow rhomboid tube. Valdes stated "The rudder was designed and built to far exceed ABS specifications. It is a solid carbon post, not a tube, and can't be compressed." (Appendix 9 Interview with Vince Valdes)

Before the rudder broke the helmsmen were tiring more quickly than earlier in the race and were only able to steer for 20 minutes at a time. cursory examination of *Uncontrollable Urge* after it washed up on the shore of San Clemente Island revealed that the rudder shaft had broken just below where the rudder shaft exits the hull.

With the rudder gone, *Uncontrollable Urge's* crew tried several different approaches to steer the boat. Two attempts were made at making a sweep type rudder from a bunk board and the boom with a carbon fiber battery hatch attached. Neither of these sweep rudders worked with the large swells hitting the beam of the boat. They tried dragging buckets from the stern, but this method of steering did not work either, and since they were being set towards the shore, this might have delayed but not prevented their grounding. In high winds and large seas the only viable option was to have an emergency rudder built to be stronger than the primary rudder, but smaller and able to be deployed in rough conditions.

Had the Islands Race been OSR Category 2 a plan review would have been required for all boats. OSR Category 0, 1, and 2 require documentation from the builder and designer which confirm that they have designed and built the boat in accordance with the ABS Standard or ISO Standard depending on the hull date. These standards better insure that boats will be able to withstand the rigors of severe weather conditions possible in an offshore race where help might not be immediately available.

While this might not have changed the rudder construction or design for *Uncontrollable Urge*, the Islands Race has the potential for heavy winds and large seas in an isolated area off the southern California coast. Given the 50 minute flight time of the USCG, outside assistance is available in the event of a serious emergency, but a high degree of self-sufficiency is required in the mean time.

Safety Gear Issues:

Anchors:

Uncontrollable Urge had two Fortress anchors aboard each with 200 feet of rode and 30 feet of chain. Both anchors were assembled and the rode faked. After the crew had tried several different means of steering, they deployed both anchors from the bow to act as drogues. There was no sea anchor aboard.

When the anchors were deployed it is likely that the water depth was greater than the length of the rode. The anchors did keep the bow into the swell which made the boat more stable. As the boat drifted backwards towards the shore it is likely that the anchors dragged through kelp. There are extensive kelp beds all around the northwest end of San Clemente Island including the area where *Uncontrollable Urge* went ashore. Presuming that kelp caught around the flukes of the Fortress anchor, it is unlikely that when the boat drifted into shallower depths the flukes would have dug into the bottom.

The Fortress FX-11 anchor carried aboard *Uncontrollable Urge* is a lightweight pivoting aluminum fluke anchor. It can be disassembled and therefore fits in an extremely small space. It weighs 7 pounds and is equivalent in performance and size to a 10-13 pound steel anchor. When set properly Fortress anchors perform as well or better than their steel counterparts.

Since the anchors were deployed in deep water, before they could have hit the bottom, it is likely that when the boat approached shallower depths the anchors skipped along the sea floor. This would have prevented the flukes from digging into the sandy and rocky bottom. It is also possible that between the sandy and rocky bottom, the high winds, and large swells anchoring would have proved impossible even had it been done properly.

Life Raft:

The Columbia 32 has a life raft compartment built into the transom. The raft compartment faces aft, and is low to the water. When the raft is deployed its placement in the compartment insures that it will hit the water and go away from the boat.

Uncontrollable Urge carried a Winslow Ultralight Offshore 6-man life raft. This raft did not have an entry ramp. (Appendix 6)

The raft painter was attached to a pad eye on the stern of the boat. When the raft was deployed from its compartment it was immediately swept by wind and waves to the end of its 50 foot painter and the ballast bags on the bottom filled. The resistance of the ballast bags, the windage of the raft, and the large swells hitting *Uncontrollable Urge* made it impossible for two crew members to manually pull the raft back to the boat. After *Uncontrollable Urge* rolled past 90 degrees, the raft painter apparently broke. It is likely that the large swell that rolled the boat provided enough force to break the painter as it is designed to do.

Auto inflating Safety Harnesses:

All six crew members were wearing auto inflating safety harnesses with tethers (Appendix 12). Five of the six were wearing a Spinlock Deck Vest and one was wearing a Stearns SOSpender. Before the boat rolled all of the crew except Georgianna had manually inflated their harnesses. When the boat rolled and Georgianna was underwater his harness auto inflated.

***As Uncontrollable Urge* rolled past 90 degrees:**

Gilmore: His Spinlock Deck Vest life jacket/harness had been manually inflated and the tether was not attached to the boat. He was swept overboard and swam ashore. The flotation chamber on the harness pulled over Gilmore's head to the left side.

Pajak: His Spinlock Deck Vest life jacket/harness had been manually inflated and the tether was not attached to the boat. He was briefly caught underwater and was swept overboard. He found the life raft floating free of the boat. The flotation chamber pulled over Pajak's head to the left side. He was able to pull the flotation chamber back into its proper position once he was in the life raft.

Georgianna: His Spinlock Deck Vest life jacket/harness auto inflated when the boat rolled. His tether was attached to the starboard jack line. While Georgianna was underwater he was pulled to the end of his tether and felt his legs being tangled in some lines. Georgianna pulled the quick release on his harness and was swept overboard. It is Georgianna's belief that being able to quickly release the tether in that situation saved his life.

Skillicorn: His Spinlock Deck Vest life jacket/harness had been manually inflated and the tether was attached to the port jack line. He also held onto the lifelines to stay aboard. Skillicorn later self released his tether and stayed with the boat until he and Valdes swam ashore using a large flat fender. While trying to swim chest down towards the shore, the waves crashing from behind forced the flotation collar over Skillicorn's head on the left side of his body.

Valdes: His Stearns SOSpender life jacket/harness had been manually inflated and the tether was not attached to the boat. He held onto the life lines and winches to stay aboard. He swam ashore with Skillicorn on a large flat fender. Valdes' flotation chamber stayed in its proper place on his body.

Williams: His Spinlock Deck Vest harness had been manually inflated and the tether was attached to the starboard jack line. When the boat rolled Williams was thrown overboard over the starboard lifelines. The starboard side was the downwind side of the boat.

He was at the end of his tether and caught in the wreckage of the mast and rigging. Valdes was unable to pull Williams back onboard the boat, and so cut his tether. At that time Williams was still conscious and alert.

When Pajak found Williams' body in the surf close to shore the flotation chamber was pulled over his head on the left side of his body and he was floating face down.

Flares:

Uncontrollable Urge carried two SOLAS Red Parachute flares and eight red hand held flares. These were in addition to the three USCG aerial meteor flares and three USCG hand held locator flares contained in the life raft.

While two crew members were deploying the raft from the stern, Pajak tried to fire two SOLAS flares to alert any other boats in the vicinity. Pajak was unable to get the plastic cap off the bottom of the first flare. The second flare worked as designed.

After the crew was ashore, Georgianna fired two of the hand held locator flares from the raft to alert the USCG helicopter of their position. The USCG helicopter did not see the flares.

Physical State of Crew:

Just after the start the crew began watches with each crew member rotating through steering, trimming, and resting every 90 minutes. Gilmore was navigating and had gotten little, if any, rest.

The crew had eaten lunch before starting at 1225 and had some snacks just prior to rounding the west end of Catalina Island around 1900. No one had eaten dinner. After the rudder broke it is likely that

none of the crew drank enough water to stay hydrated. Seasickness would have contributed to further dehydration.

The mean air temperature was 54 degrees and the water temperature was between 55 and 57 degrees. With a wind speed of 25 knots the wind chill factor would have been 48 degrees. There had been periodic rain earlier in the day. As the seas were washing over the deck everyone was wet.

After all of the crew reached shore, it is likely that all were hypothermic.

Background Information:

The Crew:

All of the of *Uncontrollable Urge's* crew were experienced racers. Four of the crew had completed the US Sailing Safety at Sea course.

James Gilmore: Gilmore has sailed for 15 years. He started sailing J-24's and J-80's and took classes at Harbor Sailboats. He and his brother, Chris Gilmore, crewed on several different race boats to gain experience. Gilmore has a Pogo in Oslo and has sailed in the Baltic.

In 2004 he bought his first Columbia 30, *Uncontrollable Urge*. He liked offshore racing better than buoy racing and extensively campaigned *Uncontrollable Urge*. The first *Uncontrollable Urge* had sailed some 27,000 miles.

After winning class in the 2010 Pacific Cup, Gilmore decided he had taken the Columbia 30 *Uncontrollable Urge* as far as it could go and ordered the new Columbia 32.

Vince Valdes: Valdes is 46, and has been sailing from a very young age. His family owns Columbia Yachts, and he is a lifelong sailor. He sailed in his first Ensenada Race at age 11. He has decades of offshore experience, including a first overall win in the 2001 Transpac Race on the Sydney 38, *Bull*.

Valdes sold Gilmore his first *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia 30C, which went on to win its class in the 2010 Pacific Cup. He worked with Gilmore on the construction of the new *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia Carbon 32. He sailed on the boat a few times doing trial sails.

Mike Skillicorn: Skillicorn is 53 years old and has sailed since he was a child. His first boat was an El Toro. When his family moved to Santa Cruz he built a 12' boat from 'Popular Mechanics'. In high school he sailed Lasers and in college multihulls. After a hiatus of several years, Skillicorn started sailing on a Henderson 30 in 1995. Later from 2000-2005 he worked for the owners of the Olson 40 *Uproarious*. In 2005 he skippered *Uproarious* in Transpac.

Skillicorn sailed on the first *Uncontrollable Urge* with James Gilmore, Chris Gilmore, and Brian Vanderzan. They sailed mostly point to point offshore races together. In 2010 they won their class in Pacific Cup.

Ryan Georgianna: Georgianna is 30 years old and has been sailing since he was 12 years old. He bought his first boat when he was 13.

He grew up racing PHRF with his Dad as well as Olson 30's, Hobie 33's and other sport boats. When he was 17 he taught sailing for 3 years. He sailed mostly in the Chesapeake.

In college he was a rower. After college he sailed on a J-109 in North Carolina and bought a Nacra cat. He sailed in Raleigh, NC and Virginia Beach, VA. In July 2011 he moved to San Diego and was a regular crew on Craig Williams' Olson 40, *Uproarious*.

He sailed with Williams from November 2011 until Williams' death. They did local offshore races together.

Williams called Georgianna to crew on the Islands Race two or three weeks before the start. The *Uncontrollable Urge* crew needed one more person as Chris Gilmore could not go on the race. Georgianna was excited to sail on a new boat and with a crew that had a proven track record in offshore races.

Doug Pajak: Pajak is 46 and has been a serious sailor for 15 years. He has sailed casually since a child. He has been a surfer for 23 years.

Pajak had only sailed with Williams and Valdes a few times. He had sailed with Gilmore and Skillicorn on other boats for a long time. He was called one or two weeks prior to the race to replace Chris Gilmore for the Islands Race crew.

Craig Williams: Williams was 36 year old. He owned the Olson 40, *Uproarious*. Williams extensively raced the Olson and recently skippered his own boat into a divisional 2nd place in the 2010 Islands Race. He had numerous podium finishes in several offshore races. Williams had completed a number of sailing courses including: US Sailing Safety at Sea, ASA Coastal Navigation and ASA Celestial Navigation. He had experience operating a variety of sail and powerboats which included living on his Morgan Out Island 41 for several years. His experience included sailing in San Francisco, placing in the Coastal Cup from San Francisco to Catalina, and over a dozen overnight passages from San Diego to Catalina. He was a member of Silvergate Yacht Club and Cortez Racing Association.

Columbia 32C Specifications:

The Columbia 32C was designed by Tim Kernan and built by Columbia Yachts in Santa Ana, California. Kernan had taken the Columbia 30C design and updated it to a light weight carbon fiber composite offshore boat.

The boat has a high speed planning hull with a fine entry, efficient high aspect lifting keel, a composite carbon fiber rudder, and a modern sail plan set on a carbon fiber bow sprit. The boat was designed to compete against the Melges 32 and Flying Tiger. It is a simple design with a small navigation station on centerline, a small galley, and two quarter berths.

The Columbia 32 is lighter than the Columbia 30, with more volume below, and more form stability. The hull is a carbon fiber composite with more robust ring frames to support the lifting keel. It has a water-tight bulkhead. It has a dedicated aft compartment for the life raft, and there is also a substantial compression post for the deck-mounted mast step.

The boat has an inboard diesel with a retractable drive. It displaces about 4,000 pounds, with 1,750 pounds ballast and has an inboard rudder instead of the transom-hung rudder on the Columbia 30. The design of the rudder for the Columbia 32 is a standard hollow rhomboid post. It was designed to meet or exceed ABS standards.

The boat has a 7/8 fractional tapered aluminum mast and an aluminum boom.

LOA: 32.0 ft

LWL: 27.0 ft

BEAM: 10.13 ft DRAFT (keel up): 2.17 ft

DRAFT (keel down): 7.5 ft

DISPLACEMENT: 3850 lbs.

SAIL AREA (triangles): 512 sf.

BALLAST: 1739 lbs.

Race Management:

The Organizing Authorities for the 2013 Islands Race were Newport Harbor Yacht Club (NHYC) and San Diego Yacht Club (SDYC). This race has been conducted since 2010 and was envisioned as an event that would help local offshore racers prepare and qualify for Transpac and longer offshore races to Mexico.

Jeff Johnson, the Regatta Manager, at San Diego Yacht Club, applied for a USCG Marine Event Permit and was told by the San Diego Sector USCG that none was required. A Marine Event Permit was obtained from the Los Angeles/Long Beach Sector USCG with instructions for the Regatta Manager at SDYC to contact USCG Sector San Diego at the conclusion of the race to verify that all competitors were accounted for. A local notice to mariners was issued.

The USCG also asked Johnson about the accessibility and utility of the Yellowbrick tracking web site. Johnson explained it was a GPS based report that shows each boat's speed, heading, and location at 15 minute intervals in real time. The boat type and owner are identified, but not the crew or boat data.

On 5 March 2013, Regatta Managers from NHYC and SDYC, the Event Chairs, and Principal Race Officer (PRO) discussed the probable weather conditions for the race. Sailflow, NOAA, Windfinder, and offshore buoy data forecasts were reviewed. It was decided to not delay the race.

The Regatta Manager of NHYC, Jenn Lancaster, reported conditions at the pre start as blustery and windy, but light and shifty for the first start. At 1830 the finish boat, M/V *Corinthian*, left the dock for the finish area and was on station prior to sunset.

Johnson was watching the Yellowbrick tracker and noticed that the track of *Uncontrollable Urge* showed a left turn near the northwest corner of San Clemente Island. At 2325 Johnson sent a text to *Corinthian* to advise

the finish boat that *Uncontrollable Urge* was near San Clemente Island and their situation was unknown. *Corinthian* was asked to listen to VHF 16 and race channel VHF 71 for any updates. At 2347 Johnson received a text from *Corinthian* that the true wind speed was 22 knots from a direction of 278 degrees. He also advised them that *Uncontrollable Urge* was one mile south of the northwest corner of San Clemente Island.

Chris Gilmore was in contact with Johnson at 0010 on 9 March and wanted to know if the SDYC race office had any information on *Uncontrollable Urge's* situation. Chris Gilmore had called *Uncontrollable Urge* and gotten no response.

At 0051 Johnson sent an email to Robert Tahimic of SCORE/San Clemente Island and asked for a contact on San Clemente Island. Johnson noted that Yellowbrick tracker indicated the *Uncontrollable Urge* was headed towards the shore. Johnson was also in contact with Lancaster to keep her updated on the situation.

Johnson called USCG Sector San Diego at 0100 and inquired about any distress calls from race boats. The USCG replied that a distress call had been received by EPIRB, and a rescue helicopter was on the way to San Clemente Island to rescue six people who were ashore. Johnson contacted Chris Gilmore and relayed the information he had received from the USCG. *Corinthian* was also contacted to update them on *Uncontrollable Urge's* situation. Johnson asked *Corinthian* to listen to VHF 16 and 22a and report anything they heard about *Uncontrollable Urge*. At 0115 *Corinthian* was reporting 28 knots true wind speed at the finish line.

Johnson placed further calls to the San Diego Command Center/ Search and Rescue to get updated information. At 0148 he sent a text to Chris Gilmore telling him the helicopter was on the scene doing hoist operations. The welfare of the crew was unknown. Chris Gilmore replied to ask if there were any injuries. At 0231 Johnson told Chris Gilmore there were injuries and a medic was with the crew, but he had no further information at that time.

Shortly after this, during a subsequent call to USCG Search and Rescue Operations for additional information, Johnson was instructed to call USCG Public Relations. He called USCG PR who was able to confirm there had been a fatality, that a press release was being written, and that it could be found online when it was posted. That report gave the information that one crew member was deceased. At 0235 Johnson placed a call to SDYC General Manager, Terry Anglin and Lancaster to tell them of the fatality. Anglin notified SDYC Commodore, Chuck Hope and Lancaster notified the NHYC General Manager, Thomas Gilbertson, and Commodore, Paul A. Marshall.

Johnson contacted Yellowbrick in England and asked them to pull *Uncontrollable Urge's* data from public access on the site. Yellowbrick stored the data separately.

Both NHYC and SDYC prepared press releases giving the facts known at the time as given by the USCG. At 0406 emails and press releases were sent to Lancaster, Commodore Hope of SDYC, Commodore Marshall of NHYC, the Event Chairs, and Carey Storm, Commodore of Silvergate Yacht Club, the victim's home Club. That email also included information of a report of a fire aboard *OEX* and a rudder failure on *Mile High Klub*.

NHYC and SDYC each locked down their Facebook pages so that no external posts could be made. Press releases of condolence and advocating privacy for the victim's family were also posted on the event website, Silvergate YC, SDYC, and NHYC's websites and Facebook pages.

At 0812 Lancaster sent a text to Johnson asking if he had heard from the *Mile High Klub* and to ascertain their situation. The *Mile High Klub* shore contact had been in contact with Johnson and was discussing plans to take a new rudder to their position. The Race Committee was not prepared to go 30 miles out to sea to assist them. The *Mile High Klub* was in contact with the USCG and in no immediate danger.

At 1300 a press conference was held at SDYC where Commodore Hope and Commodore Storm issued statements about *Uncontrollable Urge's* accident and the fatality. Commodore Storm issued a request for privacy for the victim's family and crew.

Responses from other Competitors:

The Panel sent a 10 item questionnaire to 40 skippers who sailed in the 2013 Islands Race. Twenty skippers responded to the survey.

Thirteen of the twenty were monitoring the VHF radio while racing. Seven were not. In US waters all vessels with a VHF radio must maintain a radio watch on VHF 16 when not using the radio to communicate. ¹

1

Radio Watch keeping Regulations

In general, any vessel equipped with a VHF marine radiotelephone (whether voluntarily or required to) must maintain a watch on channel 16 (156.800 MHz) whenever the radiotelephone is not being used to communicate.

Source: FCC 47 CFR §§ 80.148, 80.310, NTIA Manual 8.2.29.6.c(2)(e), ITU RR 31.17, 33.18, AP13 §25.2

Digital Selective Calling

Ships, where so equipped, shall, while at sea, maintain an automatic digital selective calling watch on the appropriate distress & safety calling frequencies [e.g. channel 70] in the frequency bands in which they are operating. If operating in a GMDSS Sea Area A1 may discontinue their watch on channel 16. However, ships, where so equipped, shall also maintain watch on the appropriate frequencies for the automatic reception of transmissions of meteorological and navigational warnings and other urgent information for ships.

Regulations on radio watch keeping exist for all boats and ships carrying marine radios, commercial, recreational, government and military, U.S. and foreign. Three U.S. government agencies, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard; and two international organizations, the International Telecommunications Union and the International Maritime Organization; have each established marine radio watch keeping regulations. Even though these rules were established for safety purposes, some confusion has existed over what these rules are, to whom they apply, and from whom they were issued.

Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC regulates all use of radio onboard any recreational, commercial, state and local government, and foreign vessel in U.S. ports and waters. These regulations are contained in Title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 80.

Were you monitoring the VHF radio while racing?	
Yes	13
No	7

Five of the boats that were monitoring the VHF heard the communication between the *Uncontrollable Urge* and USCG and one heard transmissions between *Innocent Merriment* and *Uncontrollable Urge*. At 2130 when this transmission took place the larger boats would have already cleared the southeast end of San Clemente and it is unlikely that they would have been in VHF range.

Did you hear <i>Uncontrollable Urge</i> call the USCG?	
Yes	5
No	15

The Panel was curious to know whether the weather conditions found by *Uncontrollable Urge* at the northwest end of San Clemente Islands would be characterized as the most challenging in the race. Twelve respondents found that this area was the location of the most severe weather conditions. Three stated that the southeast end of San Clemente Island was the most severe conditions and five stated that the most severe conditions were between San Clemente Island and the finish at San Diego.

Where were the conditions the most challenging?	
Northwest San Clemente Island	12
Southeast San Clemente Island	3
Between San Clemente Island and San Diego	5

Five of the respondents had problems onboard their boats. Two broke spinnaker poles, two blew out spinnakers, one blew out a headsail, one reported their VHF was not transmitting, one reported a very seasick crew member, and the *Mile High Klub* reported having a crew member injured just before the west end of Catalina Island and losing their stern hung rudder between San Clemente Island and San Diego.

Did your boat have any problems?	
Yes	5
No	15

All of the boats except the *Mile High Klub* were able to repair or mitigate the problems on their boats. The response from the *Mile High Klub* is interesting and is as follows:

1. Crew members was (sic) kept comfortable below and monitored. 2. Rudder not reparable (sic) and sea state would not allow steering by sail trim, Issued call to close-by boats on VHF and began a falshing (sic) light signal (did not shoot off a flare) , called SDYC on VHF repeatedly and NO RESPONSE. Then called Coast Guard. Coast Guard was fantastic and I am willing to be interviewed to tell the full story. Eventually (sic) got spare rudder brought out to us from another Tiger while we were about 20 miles off Pt Loma. Biggest issues - why didn't boats close aboard offer assistance (4 boats with 1/4 mile of us) and why didn't SDYC respond to VHF transmissions?

Two of the boats reported seeing or hitting flotsam. Neither reported this as a problem.

Did your boat hit anything or see any flotsam?	
Yes	2
No	18

All twenty boats reported that their crews were routinely wearing life jackets and/or safety harnesses. The only problems reported with the life jackets were two reports of unintended auto inflation.

Were your crew members routinely wearing life jackets and/or safety harnesses?	
Yes	20
No	0

Fifteen of the respondents took special safety precautions. Most of the boats reported having a safety and/or weather briefing and adding additional safety gear.

Knowing before the race started that it would be rough and windy, did you take any special precautions?	
Yes	15
No	5

Only three of the twenty considered retiring from the race. One of these three was *Mile High Klub* who lost their rudder and not able to continue racing thereafter.

Did you ever consider dropping out of the race?	
Yes	3
No	17

Findings by Dr. Stephen Shea, M.D.:

Autopsy Summary of Craig Thomas Williams

June 19, 2013

The decedent Craig Thomas Williams was discovered in the water face down with his PFD pulled over his head. He was not breathing and attempts at CPR were unsuccessful. The rescuer reported large amounts of foam coming from the decedent's mouth consistent with drowning. He did sustain minor trauma from encountering the rocks during the resuscitation attempt.

The initial external inspection by the County Coroner noted a large amount of white foam emanating from the nose and mouth. Several abrasions and small contusions were noted on both eyelids, forehead, nose, left cheek, and chin. There were no obvious injuries not on external inspection or palpitation.

A complete autopsy including multiple sections through the brain failed to demonstrate any evidence of significant blunt force trauma. The respiratory system showed fluid in the lungs with froth in the trachea and bronchi consistent with drowning.

There was a large amount of fluid in the stomach. Toxicology was negative for alcohol and other drugs tested. The official cause of death was accidental drowning and hypothermia.

Stephen Shea, M.D.

Appendix 1: Members of US Sailing Independent Inquiry Panel 2013 Islands Race

John Jourdane: In the last 55 years John has sailed over 300,000 miles. He has sailed between the west coast of the United States and Hawaii 51 times and has crossed the Atlantic Ocean 12 times. He has sailed around the world three times, including two Whitbread Round the World Races. John is the author of two books, "Icebergs, Port and Starboard" and "Sailing with Scoundrels and Kings". He has had his USCG Master's license since 1972 and has been a speaker for the US Sailing Safety at Sea Seminars for the past 25 years.

Betty S. Sherman: Betty is a lifelong sailor who has competed in offshore races and done offshore deliveries since she was a teenager. She has had her USCG license since 1998 and has been a US Sailing certified judge since 1992. In 2006 she was Commodore of San Diego Yacht Club.

Bill Stump: Bill lives in Venice, California, and hails from the nearby California Yacht Club, where he was Commodore in 1991. Since then he has served as CYC's Senior Race Officer with overall responsibility for the club's sailing and racing programs.

On a national level, Bill served on the US Sailing Board of Directors for five years, chaired their Safety at Sea Committee and One Design Class Council, and currently is a member of the Race Management and Judges Committees. He is one of thirty plus US Sailing Certified National Race Officers and is a US Sailing Certified Senior Judge, currently serving as Regional Administrative Judge for Southern California, Area J.

Dave Ullman: Dave is the three time 470 World Championship and sail maker who grew up sailing in Southern California.

He started Ullman Sails, first located in Newport Beach, in 1967 and still is active in running the now International network of sail lofts. He has won four world championships and 34 national and hemisphere championships.

Dave was named Rolex Yachtsman of the Year in 1996, and was nominated again in 2007. He is also the 2007 Melges 24 World Champion, a five-time Lipton Cup Champion (1992-1996), a ten-time Lido 14 National Champion, and a National Champion in the Snipe, Thistle, Sabot and Coronado 15 racing classes. Dave is also an S.O.R.C. class-winning skipper, a U.S. Team Racing Champion, a U.S. Men's National Champion (Mallory Cup) and a former coach of the U.S. Olympic Sailing Team.

Currently he is racing and coaching on an international level.

Appendix 2: Notice of Race:

March 8 & 9, 2013 **NOTICE OF RACE** Newport Harbor and San Diego Yacht Club

1. GENERAL

1.1. Newport Harbor Yacht Club ("NHYC") and San Diego Yacht Club ("SDYC") are the Organizing Authority ("OA") for the 2013 Islands Race ("Islands Race"). The OA invites skippers of eligible boats to enter under the conditions of this Notice of Race ("NOR").

1.2. PHRF of Southern California ("PHRF") is the Rating Authority ("RA"). All entries will race with PHRF RLC base ratings as determined by the RA.

1.3. The term Skipper as used herein is defined as the person, whether or not the owner of the boat, who is designated on the entry form, and for the purpose of rule 46/OSR 1.02, is the person in charge as it relates to the Racing Rules of Sailing, Offshore Special Regulations (OSR) or any matters related to the Islands Race. The Skipper is responsible for the boat, its handling and safety, the conduct of its crew before, during, and after the race, and compliance with the rules.

2. RULES

2.1. All boats in the Islands Race will be governed by the *rules* as described in The Racing Rules of Sailing ("RRS") and the current regulations for Race Category 3 Monohulls with liferafts in the ISAF Offshore Special Regulations ("OSR"). These supersede any other class equipment requirement.

2.2. The Islands Race is a PHRF So Cal Race Category 2.

2.3. Boats competing in a subclass (i.e. WC 70 or One Design), the rules of the relevant class will also apply.

2.4. Advertising on a boat shall comply with the requirements of ISAF Regulation 20 for Category A.

3. ALTERATIONS TO THE RULES

These changes will appear in full in the sailing instructions.

3.1.1. RRS Part 2, When Vessels Meet, will be replaced between the hours of local sunset and local sunrise by "Part B--Steering and Sailing Rules," of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea ("COLREGS").

3.1.2. RRS 50.2 Spinnaker Poles; Whisker Poles and RRS 50.3 Use of Outriggers will be modified to allow the use of fixed and retractable spinnaker poles and bowsprits for the purpose of setting asymmetrical spinnakers.

3.1.3. RRS 51, Movable Ballast will be modified to allow the movement of sails that are not set.

3.1.4. RRS 51, Movable Ballast, and RRS 52 Manual Power will be modified to allow the positioning of movable ballast by power on boats as designed and as rated by the RA. All movable ballast systems shall be capable of manual operation if powered systems are inoperable.

3.1.5. RRS 62, Redress, will be modified to allow for interference in the race by a Government Authority.

3.1.6. RRS 64.1, Penalties and Exoneration is modified by adding: (d) When the Protest Committee decides a boat that is a party to a protest hearing has broken a rule, it may assign a time penalty to be added to the boat's corrected time."

3.1.7. US Sailing prescriptions to RRS 60, 63.2 and 63.4 will not apply.

3.1.8. The Marine Industry Racer (MIR) rule of PHRF of Southern California will not apply to this race.

3.1.9. OSR 4.26 will be modified to allow boats to reef the mainsail to 30% in lieu of carrying a storm trysail, and to carry either a storm jib or a heavy-weather jib.

4. ELIGIBILITY

4.1. General Requirements

A boat shall:

- be single-hulled and self-righting;
- be built in accordance with the OSR Part 1, Section 3.03.1;
- have an overall length ("LOA") not less than 9.0 meters, and a waterline length ("LWL") not less than 7.3 meters;
- have a minimum crew of four (4) persons.

A request for exemptions to these dimensions may be made by contacting the OA prior to Monday February 4, 2013.

4.2. PHRF Rating Certificate

4.2.1. All boats must have a PHRF RLC base rating of 117 or lower to be eligible to race.

4.2.2. Each boat shall have a valid PHRF certificate issued by their PHRF organization and submitted to the OA by 3/1/2013. RRS 78.2 is modified so that a boat that does not produce a valid rating certificate as required by the NOR by the specified date will not be entered in the race.

4.2.3. A boat may not change its rating certificate after 1700h hours on 3/1/13 except as a result of a rating protest or to correct an error by the RA.

4.3. Inspections All boats are subject to ISAF Offshore Regulation 2.02–Inspection. If an inspection is required, it will be carried out according to OSR, Appendix C, Standard Inspection Card as modified by the SI. Decisions made by the OA, RC and the RA regarding any measurement or equipment dispute that arises from an inspection shall be final.

4.4. Insurance

The owner or charterer of a boat entered in the race shall hold a marine legal liability insurance policy with respect to the boat that is current when racing, with a sum insured of not less than \$500,000 USD.

4.5. Determination of Eligibility

A decision of the OA or the Race Committee as to any matter, including whether a boat and her crew meet the eligibility criteria for entry in the race, is final and binding and shall not be grounds for a request for redress.

5. ENTRY

5.1. Eligible boats may enter by completing the on-line entry form at www.islandsrace.com and by paying the \$200 entry fee on or before 2/18/13 to avoid a \$50 late fee penalty. No entry will be accepted after 3/1/13. No refunds will be issued if a boat withdraws on or after 2/18/13.

5.2. Additional Entry Requirements

Subject to acceptance of an entry by the 3/1/13
OA, an applicant shall supply the
following additional items to the OA by
their associated due date. - Valid PHRF
certificate

- Any additional class documentation for 3/1/13
subclasses (i.e. valid ORR certificate)

- All Crew information – submitted 3/7/13
electronically

March 8 & 9, 2013 **NOTICE OF RACE** Newport Harbor and San Diego Yacht Club

Amendment #1 to the Notice of Race

1. Notice of Race 3.1.9 is deleted and replaced with the following: 3.1.9 OSR 4.26 (g) for a Cat 3/Monohull race is changed to read “either a storm trysail as defined in OSR 4.26.4(c), or mainsail reefing to reduce the area by at least 25%.

Intent: This changes the OSR required percent (%) reduction in mainsail area in the case of severe weather. Prior language required a reduction “to 30%”. New language requires a reduction “by at least 25%”.

2. Notice of Race 9.1 is deleted and replaced with the following:

9.1 The Islands Race will start inside the breakwater approximately .75 nm east of Queens Gate (LB). The course allows boats to exit the Jetty in any direction, leave Santa Catalina Island and San Clemente Island to port, and finish at the Channel Entrance Buoy to San Diego Bay in the Pacific Ocean near San Diego, California.

Intent: This instruction moves the start area approximately 3 miles further east (towards Long Beach), still INSIDE the breakwater to remain clear of increased commercial barge traffic in the vicinity. All competitors are reminded of the necessity to keep clear, at all times, of all Naval vessels, and of all vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver, or constrained by their draft. Basically, if "they" are grey, or bigger than you, and moving more slowly, you should plan to keep well clear.

Race Committee

February 13, 2013

Appendix 3: Sailing Instructions:

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS Newport Harbor Yacht Club San Diego Yacht Club March 8 & 9, 2013

1 RULES

1.1 All boats in the Islands Race will be governed by the *rules* as described in *The Racing Rules of Sailing* ("RRS"), the current regulations for Race Category 3 Monohulls with liferafts in the ISAF Offshore Special Regulations ("OSR"). These supersede any other class equipment requirement.

1.2 The Islands Race is classified as PHRF Category 2. The class rules of PHRF of Southern California ("PHRF") also apply, except where they conflict with the OSR, in which case the OSR take precedence.

1.3 For boats competing in the Sled division, the Offshore Racing Rule ("ORR") applies, except as amended for the Islands Race.

1.4 In accordance with NOR 8.1, all competitors will be required to carry a tracking device supplied by the OA. There are no fees associated with this requirement; however competitors are responsible for returning the tracker in working order. Broken or lost trackers may be subject to replacement/damage charge of up to \$1000. Tracking devices will be available at the following times and locations:

☐ Wednesday, March 6 between 1000 and 2100 @ NHYC

☐ Thursday March 7 between 1000 – 2100 @ NHYC

☐ By prior arrangement (call 949-723-6869) between 1100 – 1400 on 3/8/13 in the vicinity of the starting area via NHYC Mark Set Vessel VSR on VHF 71.

After the race, trackers should be dropped off at the SDYC Sailing Office between 0900 and 1700 on Saturday, March 9, 2013. If for any reason you are unable to complete the race and return to a port other than San Diego, please call 619-758-6310 and let the Sailing Office know what arrangements you will make to return the tracker.

2 AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES

2.1 RRS Part 2, When Vessels Meet, is replaced between the hours of local sunset and local sunrise by "Part B-- Steering and Sailing Rules," of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea ("COLREGS").

2.2 RRS 50.2 Spinnaker Poles; Whisker Poles and RRS 50.3 Use of Outriggers are modified to allow the use of fixed and retractable spinnaker poles and bowsprits for the purpose of setting asymmetrical spinnakers.

2.3 RRS 51, Movable Ballast is modified to allow the movement of sails that are not set.

2.4 RRS 51, Movable Ballast, and RRS 52 Manual Power are modified to allow the positioning of movable ballast by power on boats as designed and as rated by the RA. All movable ballast systems shall be capable of manual operation if powered systems are inoperable.

2.5 RRS 62 Redress: RRS 62.1 is modified by adding the following: (e) being directed by a Government Authority to deviate from her proper course."

2.6 US Sailing prescriptions to RRS 60, 63.2 and 63.4 will not apply.

2.7 RRS 64.1, Penalties and Exoneration, is modified by adding: (d) When the Protest Committee decides a boat that is a party to a protest hearing has broken a rule, it may assign a time penalty to be added to the boat's corrected time."

2.8 The Marine Industry Racer (MIR) rule of PHRF of Southern California does not apply to this race.
www.islandsrace.com

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS March 8 & 9, 2013

2.9 OSR 3.29.1(a) i is deleted and replaced with: "i - an emergency antenna when the regular antenna depends upon the mast or backstay."

2.10 OSR 4.26 (g) for a Cat 3/Monohull with liferaft race is changed to read "either a storm trysail as defined in OSR 4.26.4(c), or mainsail reefing to reduce the area by at least 25%.

2.11 PHRF 10.5 will be changed to specify a minimum crew requirement of 4.

2.12 US SAILING prescription to OSR 5.01.1 is modified to read as follows: All personnel on deck shall wear personal flotation at all times except when the captain of the boat directs that it may be set aside.

3 NOTICES TO COMPETITORS

Notices to competitors will be posted on the official notice board online (www.islandsrace.com) and on the notice boards at NHYC located in the main hallway and at SDYC located on the east side of the Sailing Center, facing the water.

4 CHANGES TO THE SAILING INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 Changes Made Ashore

Any change to the SI made prior to 1800, March 7, 2013 will be posted online at the race website and on the supplementary notice board at NHYC.

4.2 Changes Made Afloat

Per RRS 90.2(c), any change to the SI made after 1800, March 7, 2013 will be announced afloat prior to the warning signal for the class to which it applies. The RC signal boat will display flag "L" to indicate that a change is being made, and the change will be announced via VHF 71.

5 SCHEDULE

Divisions, Flags, and Scheduled Warning Signals are as follows:

Division

	Division Flag	Time of Warning
3	Numeral pennant 4	12:25
2	Numeral pennant 3	12:55
1	Numeral pennant 2	13:25
ORR	Numeral pennant 1	13:55

6 CHECK-IN

6.1 The Race Committee intends to be on station beginning at 11:15.

- 6.2 A boat will be required to check in via radio no later than fifteen (15) minutes before her scheduled warning signal and be in the starting area.
- 6.3 Boats shall check in via VHF Channel 72. A boat must announce her name, sail number and number of crew on board and be acknowledged by the RC.
- 6.4 Boats who fail to check in will be scored DNS without a hearing.

7 THE COURSE

- 7.1 Each boat shall *start*, leave Catalina Island to port, leave San Clemente Island to port, and *finish* at San Diego Channel buoy "SD".
- 7.2 The diagrams in Appendix A show the course, the order in which marks are to be passed, and the side on which each mark is to be left. The approximate course length will be 129.5 nautical miles.
- www.islandsrace.com

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS March 8 & 9, 2013

8 AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONCERN

- 8.1 The RC advises competitors that the start area and surrounding waters may have underwater features that may impact deeper draft vessels.
- 8.2 The RC advises that the exit from the starting area thru any of the openings in the Long Beach breakwater are also designated navigational channels for commercial vessels that are constrained by draft, and which have right of way over sailboats.
- 8.3 The second mark of the course (San Clemente Island) is a designated US Navy weapons testing range.
- 8.4 The finish mark is in the vicinity of significant kelp growth. Please navigate responsibly when making landfall.
- 8.5 While the RC is *not* designating these areas (8.1 – 8.4) or its features as *obstructions* in these SI, we strongly urge competitors to consult the preamble to RRS Part 2 and all current applicable navigation charts and Local Notices to Mariners. We also urge competitors to maintain a proper radio watch (VHF 16) and to heed specific warnings and directives as conditions require in these areas.

9 MARKS

- 9.1 The following marks are rounding or gate marks or corners of a boundary: **Mark**
- | | Mark Name | Mark Type |
|---|---------------------|------------------|
| 1 | Catalina Island | Rounding |
| 2 | San Clemente Island | Rounding |

- 1
- 2
- 9.2 The start marks will be the race committee signal boat and an inflatable yellow mark.
- 9.3 The finish marks will be the San Diego Bay Approach Lighted Whistle Buoy "SD" located approximately at 32°37.33N - 117°14.75W and a nearby race committee boat or inflatable yellow mark.

10 THE START

- 10.1 The starting line will be located inside the Los Angeles Harbor breakwater approximately .75 nm east of Queens Gate (LB) which is the middle opening. Boats are permitted to exit the harbor through either gate.
- 10.2 The starting line will be between a staff displaying an orange flag on the RC signal boat and the course side of starting mark.
- 10.3 As a courtesy, the RC will attempt to hail any boat it identifies as OCS via VHF 71. Failure to make a hail or failure of communications equipment will not be grounds for redress. This changes RRS 62.1(a).

11 THE FINISH

11.1 The time limit for all boats to *finish* will be 1700 Saturday, March 9, 2013. This changes RRS 35.

11.2 A boat that fails to *finish* by the time limit will be scored Did Not Finish without a hearing. This changes RRS A4 and A5.

11.3 When a boat is within 5 nm of Channel buoy SD, she shall be responsible for attempting to contact the "Islands Race Committee" on VHF 71. This communication should include an estimated time of arrival at the finish line. www.islandsrace.com

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS March 8 & 9, 2013

11.4 The finishing line will be approximately 200 yards long and located between the course side of the Channel Buoy "SD" and an flag on the finish boat bearing 350 mag. from Channel buoy "SD". The Race Committee will attempt to notify the boat when she has finished.

11.4.1 In the event circumstances or sea state dictates, a finish boat may be replaced by a yellow inflatable mark. RC vessels may remain in the area to observe a boat's finish and finish time.

11.4.2 In the event the finish boat and an inflatable mark are missing, the finish will be per the US SAILING prescription to RRS 34. For the purpose of defining "90 deg. to the last leg", the finishing line will be "the shortest practicable length" or approximately 200 yards long and on an axis defined by Channel Buoy SD and the Point Loma light (sighting to Channel Buoy SD @ 170 deg. mag / sighting to the Point Loma light @ 350 deg. mag.)

11.5 After *finishing*, a boat shall log her finish time from a GPS report in Pacific Standard Time. In the event no contact has been made with the Race Committee, as soon as she is safely within San Diego Harbor, a boat shall call the SDYC Sailing Office at 619-758-6310 with her name, finish time, and a contact number. Leave a voicemail if there is no answer. Speak slowly and clearly and repeat your contact number.

12 PROTESTS AND REQUESTS FOR REDRESS

12.1 Protest forms will be available on the notice board at SDYC. Protests and requests for redress or reopening shall be delivered to a person either at the dockside room (facing the water in the Sailing Center) or at the Front Desk at SDYC (available during business hours only) and within the appropriate time limit.

12.2 Notices of protests and requests for redress filed will be posted and updated as quickly as possible to inform competitors of hearings in which they are parties or named as witnesses. Hearings will be held in the Dockside room located on the first floor of the Sailing Center at SDYC, and may be heard as soon as the *parties* are available.

12.3 Notices of protest by the race committee or protest committee will be posted to inform boats under RRS 61.1(b).

12.4 The protest time limit for all boats is 1830, March 9, 2013, or 90 minutes after the last boat *finishes*, whichever is earlier. This change modifies RRS 61.3.

12.5 A request for reopening a hearing shall be delivered no later than 30 minutes after the requesting party was informed of the decision. This changes RRS 66.

13 SCORING

13.1 PHRF Category (Overall and Divisions)

13.1.1 The RC will score all boats, regardless of a boat's division, for the overall award.

13.1.2 The RC will calculate a boat's PHRF corrected time by multiplying her elapsed time by her time correction factor ("Race TCF").

13.2 ORR Category (Sled Division)

13.2.1 The RC will calculate a boat's corrected time by multiplying her elapsed time by her ORR Off wind TCF.

14 SAFETY REGULATIONS

A boat that retires from the race shall notify the RC as soon as possible with her final destination and ETA ashore.

In the event they are unable to contact the RC on VHF 16 or 71, they should call/text the SDYC Sailing Office at 858-366-3392 or leave a voicemail on 619-758-6309 with the revised information. www.islandsrace.com

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS March 8 & 9, 2013

15 PRIZES

15.1 Prizes will be given as follows:

The first boat to finish will be commemorated on the Newport Harbor Yacht Race Sailing Race Free for All to San Diego Aug. 9, 1924 First Prize won by *Viking IV* Admiral Albert Soiland ("Free for All") perpetual trophy and will receive a take-home trophy.

The overall winner, scored on corrected time, will be commemorated on the Delaney perpetual trophy. The overall winner and the boats that earn the overall second- and third-place scores will receive take-home trophies.

The top boats scored on corrected time in all divisions will receive take-home trophies.

16 DISCLAIMER

Sailing is an activity that has an inherent risk of damage and injury. Competitors in this race participate entirely at their own risk. See RRS 4, Decision to Race. The race organizers (OA, RA, Race Committee, Protest Committee, host clubs, sponsors, or any other organization or official) will not be responsible for damage to any boat or other property or the injury to any competitor, including death, sustained as a result of participation in this race. By participating in this race, each competitor agrees to release the race organizers from any and all liability associated with such competitor's participation in this event to the fullest extent permitted by law. **SAILING INSTRUCTIONS** Newport Harbor Yacht Club San Diego Yacht Club March 8 & 9, 2013

A. APPENDIX A - ILLUSTRATION OF COURSE DETAILS

A1. Approximate Course

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS Newport Harbor Yacht Club San Diego Yacht Club March 8 & 9, 2013

A2. Detail of Approximate Starting Area in LA Harbor Inside Middle Breakwater

Start

NOT TO SCALE

A3. Detail of Approximate Finish Area South of Point Loma

Finish

Pt Loma Light

NOT TO SCALE


SD www.islandsrace.com

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS March 8 & 9, 2013

APPENDIX B - DIVISION ASSIGNMENTS

The official version of Appendix B has been created as a separate document. Please view "Appendix B – Official Division Assignments" from the www.islandsrace.com website.

Appendix 4: USCG Event Permits:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-4424a (Rev. 12-10)		PERMIT FOR MARINE EVENT	DATE APPROVED <u>3/4/13</u>
NAME OF EVENT <u>Islands Race</u>		LOCATION <u>Los Angeles to San Diego</u>	DATE OF EVENT <u>03/08 03/09/2013</u>
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION <u>San Diego/Newport Yacht Club</u>		NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE <u>C Jeff Johnson</u>	TITLE <u>Event Organizer</u>
<p>Your application for the following event is approved. Sponsor services to be rendered by the Coast Guard are listed. You are reminded that your organization is primarily responsible for safety in the race's area and that this permit does not relieve you of such responsibility. Participants shall be adequately briefed and their boats equipped as required by law. A permit may also be required by a state, county, or municipal agency. This sail officer grants no exemption from state or local ordinances. In the event of any change in the information furnished in your application you will notify this office.</p>			
<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> There will not be a Special Local Regulation issued. No restriction is placed on the use of any navigable waters by other parties. Your event shall not obstruct any channel of normal shipping lane, or interfere with any aid to navigation. The Commissioner in Charge shall control participants & prevent conditions hazardous to other craft in the area.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> There will be a Special Local Regulation issued establishing a restricted area and other controls. You will be provided a copy for guidance. The Commissioner in Charge shall control participants to prevent conditions hazardous to other craft in the area.</p>			
<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> There will be a Local Notice to Mariners issued to inform mariners interests and advise their suspension.</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> There will not be a Regatta Point assigned by the Coast Guard.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> There will be a Regatta Point assigned by the Coast Guard. The attached instruction to Port Commanders outlines their responsibility and authority. You should work out specific details with the Port Commander.</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Additional safety equipment is stipulated below.</p>			
2013-CGR			
<p>Your request for the 2013 "Islands Race" is approved. You may however, be required to obtain approval from other agencies (local, state, and federal) that have jurisdiction within the area. My point of contact for Marine Event Permits is Lieutenant Kate First Class Guy Johnson at (310) 821 5867.</p>			
Sincerely,			
 A.M. Jones Chief, Waterways Management Division Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Coast Guard By Direction			
<p>You are instructed to contact Coast Guard Sector San Diego Command Center at (619) 574-7033 upon verification of the location of all participants following the conclusion of the event. You are also to ensure all participants are aware of any hazards to navigation (i.e., Shoals, Commercial Traffic lanes, Naval Security zone (YO San Clemente Island) along the intended race route. All participants are reminded to maintain a lookout at all times and abide by all applicable Navigation Rules.</p>			

PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED

MISLE #: 4510885
PERMIT #: SD 035-13



Commander
United States Coast Guard
Sector San Diego

2710 N. Harbor Drive
San Diego, CA 92101
Phone: (619) 278-7656
Fax: (619) 278-7035

16751

JAN 16 2013

Jeff Johnson
San Diego Yacht Club
1011 Anchorage Lane
San Diego, CA 92106

Mr. Johnson,

I have received your Application for Marine Event dated December 9, 2012, in which you requested approval for the Islands Race marine event, San Diego Bay, CA; March 8-9, 2013. I have reviewed your application and since the event is also in another Captain of the Port Zone, it has been forwarded to Sector Los Angeles / Long Beach (Sector LA/LB) for their review and permitting, if not already reviewed.

At this time, Coast Guard Sector San Diego will not need to permit your event as described since it does not pose any additional risks beyond the limits of existing Navigation Rules. You may still be required to receive one for the Sector LA/LB Captain of the Port zone where your event commences from. It is your responsibility to contact this office if there are any changes to the event, including number of participants and/or spectators, location, or any other significant changes that influence our decision to issue an event permit. In addition to a Coast Guard permit, you are reminded that you must comply with all existing Federal, State, and local laws and other requirements that may impact your ability to hold your event as proposed. You should take appropriate action to ensure you comply with all such requirements prior to holding your event.

Because of the dynamic nature of the waterway, boating, and maritime activities, the Coast Guard carefully considers the totality of the risk associated with each event on a case-by-case basis when determining permit requirements. Although this event did not require a Coast Guard marine event permit for Sector San Diego, similar events in the future may require a permit. For that reason, you should continue to submit the regatta/marine parade application as required by 33 CFR 100.15 for any events you may wish to hold in the future. All applications must be submitted no less than **135 days** before the start of the proposed event to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to evaluate and assess the safety and environmental requirements.

Nothing in this determination is intended to restrict the Coast Guard's ability to take action authorized under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the Magnuson Act, or other authorities to ensure the safety of vessels and waterfront facilities, and the protection of the navigable waters and the resources therein. Such action could include promulgation of Regulated Navigation

MISLE #: 4510885
PERMIT #: SD 035-13
JAN 16 2013

Areas or Limited Access Areas, the making of broadcast or print safety notices, or other actions taken under the authorities granted the U. S. Coast Guard.

The sponsor shall print and maintain a copy of this letter for the duration of the event. If questioned by law enforcement or public officials, the sponsor must be able to produce a copy of the signed letter. If you wish to receive the original hard copy of this letter for your records please send a request by replying with the appropriate mailing address.

Contact Marine Events at 619-278-7656 or send an email to D11-PF-MarineEventsSanDiego@uscg.mil if you have any questions.

Best wishes for a safe, successful event!

Sincerely,



J. E. BANNON
Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Waterways Management Division

Appendix 5: Weather Data:

MARINE WEATHER INCIDENT REPORT

PREPARED FOR
U.S. Sailing Review Panel
ON
May 13, 2013
VESSEL : "Uncontrollable Urge"
INCIDENT LOCATION : APPROX 33.00N 118.60W
INCIDENT TIME : APPROX 9:30PM - 11:30PM Mar. 8 2013
PREPARED BY
SAM WILSON
sam@surflines.com
M.S. METEOROLOGY
SCIENTIST
SURFLINE.COM | BUOYWEATHER.COM

Summary

This report focuses on the sea state and weather conditions that were present at the time and location of the sailboat accident that occurred on San Clemente Island during the Islands Race on the evening of 8 Mar 2013. The incident time is based between the time the mayday call was made and the time of the vessel's grounding -- 9:30PM - 11:30PM Local Pacific Time on the 8 Mar 2013. The incident location referred to in this document is the location of the vessel's grounding on the NW side of San Clemente Island. A large scale high pressure system located over the NE Pacific Ocean approached the western United States throughout the day on Mar 8 and interacted with a low pressure system located over the interior United States. The pressure gradient between the high and low pressure systems caused an increase in winds over the Southern California Bight in the afternoon/evening hours on Mar 8, resulting in wind speeds of 20-25 knots with stronger gusts coming from the WNW at the time of the incident on the NW side of San Clemente Island. Two weather models (GFS and RUC) were used to determine the general weather pattern over the incident area and the winds that were present.

Nearby NDBC buoys were used to confirm the winds shown by the models and all are in agreement. Minor precipitation was developing and present before and during the incident, however this precipitation remained confined to the east of San Clemente Island and moved eastward over the Southern

California coastline as the incident was unfolding. Visibility just west and northwest of San Clemente Island at the time of the incident was between 3 and 5 miles and cloud cover was 70-80%.

Three separate wave events were present which affected the sea-state at the time and location of the incident. In deep water outside of the Channel Islands, a WNW swell of 3.5 feet at 17 seconds, a SSW swell of 2 feet at 18 seconds, and a WNW wind wave event of 10 feet at 10 seconds were all impacting the Southern California Bight simultaneously. Given that the incident location is slightly shadowed from waves coming in from the WNW/NW direction, the exact height of those wave events were likely smaller directly offshore of the incident location. However, the combination of all three wave events were expected to have generated a significant wave height of 7-8 feet with inconsistent larger waves likely inside the Channel Islands just offshore of the incident location. It should be noted that the wave heights mentioned above are not those breaking in the surf zone. In shallow water, inside the surf zone, the above swells are expected to have produced breaking wave heights in the 8ft range with occasional larger waves where the vessel grounded. Sea surface temperatures were in the 55-57 degree Fahrenheit range and sea surface currents were light (~ 0.3 kt) and moving towards the east at the time and location of the incident.





Figure 1: Map showing the incident location (crosshair) on San Clemente Island with nearby NDBC buoys 46047 (Tanner Bank), 46086 (San Clemente Basin), and CDIP buoy 100 (Torrey Pines Outer) - circled and labeled.

****NOTES**** NDBC buoys 46047, 46086, and CDIP buoy 100 are used to determine the wind and wave conditions around the time of the incident. The incident time is based between the time the mayday call was made and shortly after the vessel's grounding -- 9:30PM - 11:30PM Local Pacific Time on the 8 Mar 2013.


a)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 06Z08MAR2013




b)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 12Z08MAR2013




c)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 18Z08MAR2013




d)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 00Z09MAR2013



e)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 06Z09MAR2013



f)

GFS 10m Wind Barb(kt) | Mean Sea Level Pressure (hPa) 12Z09MAR2013





Figure 2: Mean Sea Level Pressure and Wind Speed analysis from the Global Forecast System (GFS) weather model showing the general weather pattern in place surrounding the time of the incident. Maps valid at **a) 06Z 8 Mar 2013 (10PM Local Pacific Time on the 7th), b) 12Z 8 Mar 2013 (4AM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), and c) 18Z 8 Mar 2013 (10AM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), d) 00Z 9 Mar 2013 (4PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), e) 06Z 9 Mar 2013 (10PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), and f) 12Z 9 Mar 2013 (4AM Local Pacific Time on the 9th).**

****NOTES** For reference, the incident occurred at approx. 5:30Z - 7:30Z 9 Mar 2013 (9:30PM - 11:30PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th). Charts above display wind speed in knots. Below is a reference chart that shows how to read wind barbs:**

Wind Speed & Direction



Barbs point to direction wind is coming from.


(1 Knot = 1.15 mph)

ANALYSIS:


Broad scale, moderate strength, high pressure was in place over the NE Pacific Ocean offshore of California with a complex area of low pressure situated over California and the western United States. Between 06Z 8 Mar and 12Z 9 Mar, the high-pressure system pushed eastward towards the western United States while low pressure to the east moved

inland over the interior United States. As a result, the pressure gradient between the high and low pressure systems pushed closer to California causing an increase in wind speed over the Southern California Bight approaching the time of the incident. Near gale force winds (20-30 kts) coming from the NW/NNW were in place offshore and North of Pt. Conception. Winds increased in strength from 5-10kts in the late morning/early afternoon on Mar 8th to 20-25kts with stronger gusts at the time and location of the incident within the Southern California Bight. The wind direction was from the WNW/NW at the time and location of the incident - see Figures 3 and 4.


a)




b)



c)



d)



e)





Figure 3: Mean Sea Level Pressure and Wind Speed analysis from the Rapid Update Cycle (RUC) hourly weather model showing the local winds in place surrounding the time of the incident. Maps valid at **a) 05Z 9 Mar 2013 (9:00PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), b) 06Z 9 Mar 2013 (10:00PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), c) 07Z 9 Mar 2013 (11:00PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th), d) 08Z 9 Mar 2013 (Midnight Local Pacific Time on the 8th), and e) 09Z 9 Mar 2013 (1:00AM Local Pacific Time on the 9th).**

****NOTES** For reference, the incident occurred at approx. 5:30Z - 7:30Z 9 Mar 2013 (9:30PM - 11:30PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th). Charts above display wind speed in knots.**


ANALYSIS:

Winds derived from the RUC model were ~20kts and coming from the WNW at the time and location of the incident. Stronger wind speeds of 25kts can be seen upstream and in the vicinity of the incident location. The model depicts a slight increase in winds shortly after the incident (Figure 3e). Wind gusts are not accounted for here and were in the 25-30kt range at the time and location of the incident - see Figure 4 for wind measurements from nearby NDBC buoys.

a)




NDBC 46047



b)

NDBC 46086






Figure 4: Wind Speed (kts) and Wind Direction time series recorded by **a)** NDBC buoy 46047 and **b)** NDBC buoy 46086 - see Figure 1 for the location of these buoys. The incident time frame is indicated on the plots (vertical dashed lines). Wind speed is shown as the solid black line and wind gust is shown as the dashed red line on the wind speed plots (Figure 4a and 4b - top). Wind direction is shown as the solid black line on the wind direction plots (Figure 4a and 4b - bottom). N (north), W (west), S (south), and E (east) are indicated on the y axis of the wind direction plots. This is the direction the wind is coming from.

ANALYSIS:

Winds increased in strength from 5-10kts in the late morning/early afternoon on the 8th to 20-25kts with stronger gusts at the time of the incident at nearby NDBC buoys 46047 and 46086. Winds veered from the W to NW in the late morning/early afternoon on the 8th before holding steady out of the WNW at the time of the incident.





Figure 5: Quantitative Precipitation Forecast issued by the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center prior to the incident at ~22Z Mar 8 2013 (2PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th). Precipitation forecast (shaded colors) is valid from 00Z Mar 9 2013 (4PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th) to 12Z Mar 9 2013 (4AM Local Pacific Time on the 9th).

ANALYSIS:

Minor precipitation (< 0.1 inches) was predicted to occur at the time and in the vicinity of the incident. This precipitation was predicted to occur directly along the Southern California coastline to the east of San Clemente Island.



a)

0257 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.rap.ucar.edu/radar/>





b)

0357 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.nap.ucar.edu/radar/>





c)

0458 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.rap.ucar.edu/radar/>





d)

0558 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.nap.ucar.edu/radar/>




e)

0657 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.nap.ucar.edu/radar/>



f)

0757 UTC Sat 09 Mar 2013 (c) UCAR <http://weather.nap.ucar.edu/radar/>



-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Reflectivity (dBZ)

Figure 6: Regional radar reflectivity from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) showing precipitation in the area at **a)** 0257 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**6:57PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**), **b)** 0357 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**7:57PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**), **c)** 0458 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**8:58PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**), **d)** 0558 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**9:58PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**), **e)** 0657 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**10:57PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**) and **f)** 0757 UTC 9 Mar 2013 (**11:57PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**).

ANALYSIS:

Precipitation increased within the Southern California Bight from ~ 7:00PM - 10:00PM on Mar 8th but was confined to the east of San Clemente Island as predicted by the

Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (Figure 5). By ~11:00PM, the precipitation moved inland along the Southern California coast which was a result of the increasing winds out of the WNW.




Figure 7: Visibility chart issued by the Ocean Prediction Center valid 07Z 9 Mar 2013 (11:00PM Local Pacific time on the 8th).

ANALYSIS:


An un-shaded contour surrounds an area just west of San Clemente Island at 07Z 9 Mar 2013 (11:00PM Local Pacific time on the 8th) indicating that visibility was between 3 and 5 miles within that area. Cloud cover indicated by the station circle in the area was 70 to 80% -- see below reference chart for how to read the station circles:

5


Code No. N SKY COVER

0		No clouds
1		One tenth or less, but not zero
2		Two-tenths to three-tenths
3		Four-tenths
4		Five-tenths
5		Six-tenths
6		Seven-tenths to eight-tenths
7		Nine-tenths or over cast with openings
8		Completely overcast (ten-tenths)
9		Sky obscured

a)



b)



c)




Figure 8: Surflines.com sorted swell events at **a)** NDBC buoy 46047, **b)** NDBC buoy 46086, and **c)** CDIP Buoy 100 (see Figure 1 for the locations of these buoys). Event swell heights are shown in feet in the top graph with corresponding event directions shown in the bottom graph. The different colored lines indicate different swell events. The thin black lines in the swell height plots (top) represent the significant wave height. Event wave periods are shown in between the top and bottom graphs.

ANALYSIS:

Three swells of significance were in place and affecting the area at the time of the incident.

Swell 1: A WNW swell with a height ~3.5 feet and a period of 17-18 seconds in deep water, as seen in Figure 8a (NDBC buoy 46047) - green lines late on Mar 8th. This swell is slightly smaller (~2.5 feet) and more westerly in direction at NDBC buoy 46086 (Figure 8b) as a result of wave

refraction (swell wrapping) and island blocking - blue lines late on Mar 8th.

Swell 2: Increasing wind waves from the WNW with a height of ~10 feet and a period of 10 seconds, as seen in Figure 8a (NDBC buoy 46047) - red lines late on Mar 8th. Again, this wind wave event was smaller (~6-7 feet) and more

westerly in direction at NDBC buoy 46086 (Figure 8b) - red lines late on Mar 8th.

Swell 3: A SSW southern hemisphere swell with a height ~2 feet and a period of 18 seconds, as seen in Figure 8c (CDIP buoy 100) - blue lines late on Mar 8th. CDIP buoy 100 is relatively sheltered from the WNW swell event (Swell 1) making it easier to see the southern hemisphere swell which typically have small wave heights due to extreme travel distance.

The incident location on San Clemente Island is relatively exposed to all three wave events that were in place at the time of the incident. However, there is some swell shadowing for swells coming from the NW/WNW directions due to blocking from other islands within the Southern California Bight. Both swells (Swell 1 and Swell 2) likely

impacted the incident location with a similar height to those at NDBC buoy 46086 (Figure 8b). The incident location is fully exposed to the southern hemisphere swell (Swell 3), thus waves from that event likely traveled in relatively unaffected before entering the surf zone. The combination of these three wave events were expected to produce a relatively "confused" sea state with a significant wave height of ~7-8 feet inside the Channel Islands just offshore of the incident location.

Statistically, less frequent but larger waves did occur. As previously mentioned, breaking wave heights within the surf zone were expected to be in the 8ft range with occasional larger waves at the time and location of the incident.




Figure 9: Sea Surface Temperature (shaded colors) measured from the MODIS satellite (image courtesy of NASA).

ANALYSIS:

Sea surface temperatures measured by the MODIS satellite were in the 55-57 degree Fahrenheit range at the time and location of the incident.




Figure 10: Sea Surface Current speed in knots and direction (vectors) from the High Frequency (HF) Radar valid at 06Z 9 Mar 2013 (**10PM Local Pacific Time on the 8th**).

ANALYSIS:

Generally light sea surface currents (~ 0.3 kt) were present at the location of the incident and moving towards the east in the direct vicinity of the incident. Further offshore to the west, similar current speeds were in place but moving towards the SE/SSE.

Appendix 6: Uncontrollable Urge Safety Equipment:

Uncontrollable Urge

Provisional Safety Equipment List on Islands Race Mar 9, 2013

Navigation & Communications

- Navigation Lights – mast head 360 degree plus secondary deck-mounted
- Paper charts covering Southern CA.
- Electronic charts – both NOAA raster and C-Map vector covering North America and Hawaii
- PC chart plotter running Expedition
- Hand held Garmin 76 GPS in ditch bag and one Garmin handheld hiking GPS (coordinates only)
- Em-trak B-100 AIS system including dedicated GPS
 - Note – this was setup to receive-only as we had not yet received FCC license and MMSI. AIS broadcasting vessels were displayed on PC in Expedition.
- Hand bearing compass in ditch bag
- Bulkhead mounted cockpit compass
- VHF radio w/MMSI installed at nav station
- 2x handheld VHF radios – one in ditch bag, one in MOB Bag
- Iridium satellite phone in cradle at nav station w/hard-wired antenna
 - Spare Iridium antenna in ditch bag
- Davis radar-reflector
- Nexus instrument package, including GPS

Interior

- Wood plugs at each through-hull
- 2x bilge pumps – one manual and one electric
 - Handles for manual pumps secured w/lanyards
- Bucket w/lanyard, canvas bucket
- 2x Anchors, sized for larger boat-each:
 - Fortress model FX-11
 - 200' rode - 7/16
 - 30' chain
 - Anchors were assembled and rode flaked
- 2x Fire extinguishers
- Fire blanket at galley
- Boat hook
- 1 McMurdo EPIRB- Hydrostatic (stored in starboard bunk, not yet installed)
- Primary ditch bag (flotation) containing:

- 1 McMurdo EPIRB- manual
- Hand bearing compass
- Hand held VHF w/spare batteries
- Flares:
 - 2 SOLAS Red Parachute flares (purchased from West Marine)
 - 8 hand-held flares
- Emergency blankets (quantity: 4)
- Air horn – compressed CO2 type
- Air horn – manual type
- 1 Signaling mirrors
- Emergency VHF antenna
- High-power Spotlight
- Flashlight w/spares
- Spare Iridium satellite phone antenna
- Powerbars (quantity 8)
- 3x glowsticks
- MOB Bag (flotation)
 - 2 Red SOLAS parachute flares (purchased from West Marine)
 - 1 handheld VHF
 - 1 mirror/whistle combination
 - 1 Red Rescue Laser
 - 1 McMurdo PLB
 - Extra batteries for VHF
 - All items except flares had lines attached to MOB Bag
- Bag containing four Type 1 Life Jackets, 2 Type 1 Life Jackets
- First aid kit
- Tool bag with pliers, hammers, wrenches etc (appx 25 lbs)
 - Cable shears
- Sail repair kit
- Spares kit (electrical wire, zip ties, etc)
- Flotation devices were labeled with “Urge” and had one piece of reflective tape.

Cockpit

- Manual bilge pump & handle
- Bulkhead mounted compass
- Knife lashed to tiller
- MOM-8
- Lifesling with water activated strobe

- 1x Type IV throwable cushions, 2 flotation fenders
- Winslow Ultralight Offshore 6-man life raft stowed in life raft compartment at stern w/painter attached to boat.
 - Included Basic Offshore Equipment Package:
 - Manual Inflation Pump – Spring Loaded Return w/ Adapter
 - 1 Repair Kit (Includes: Repair Tape, Repair Clamp (3”) & 2 PRV Plugs w/ Tether)
 - 1 Collapsible Bailer Bucket w/ Handle
 - 2 Sponges
 - 2 Paddles w/Retro Reflective Segments
 - 1 Signal Mirror (3”x5”)
 - 1 USCG/SOLAS Whistle
 - 1 Extended Life Flashlight (Sealed Case)
 - 2 Spare Alkaline Batteries & Spare Xenon Bulb Assembly for Magnum MityLite™
 - 3 USCG Aerial Meteor Flares
 - 3 USCG Hand Held Locator Flares
 - 1 Orange Smoke Signal
 - 1 Rescue Streamer™ Ribbon (6” x 25’)
 - 1 Retaining Line (75’)
 - 1 Sea Dye Marker
 - Water Rations (4oz./Person)
 - Anti-Seasickness Tablets (6/Person)
 - Sun Block (Minimum 30SPF)
 - 1 First Aid Kit
 - 1 Fishing Kit
 - Nitrile Gloves (1 Pair/2 Person)
 - 1 Raft Knife
 - 1 Utility Knife (SS Lockback)
 - 1 Water Storage Bag
 - 1 Survival Manual
- Jack lines installed both port & starboard
 - West Marine webbing style
- Heaving line in throw bag


Heavy Air Sails

- Heavy air jib – 90% Dacron/Kevlar Elliot Pattison
- Storm jib and storm trysail – Dacron Elliot Pattison


- Note – these were inspected and installed on the boat by the crew on Sunday, March 3rd. This was to ensure they were in good condition as well as to familiarize the crew with how they worked.

Appendix 7: Uncontrollable Urge chart plots:


Course plot for Islands Race course – est. nautical mileage = 134.




Course plot passing San Clemente Island (solid blue line). *Uncontrollable Urge* waypoints seen at north end of Island.




Course Plot (solid blue line) and *Uncontrollable Urge* Waypoints. Green line is distance from approx. rudder failure point to nearest land (1.82 nm).




Course plot (solid blue line) and *Uncontrollable Urge* waypoint plots. Green line is measurement of *Uncontrollable Urge* path (3.36 nm) between 2130 and 0045 (3 hrs 15 min).





Uncontrollable Urge Waypoints on beach approach. Measured distance between 2245 and 2330 noted as .56 nm.



Uncontrollable Urge Waypoints on beach approach. Measured distance between 2345 and 0000 noted as 220 yds.



Appendix 8: Photos of *Uncontrollable Urge* on San Clemente Island:









Appendix 9: Crew Interviews:

Uncontrollable Urge Interview

With skipper, James Gilmore

May 3 2013

By Betty Sherman

Gilmore has sailed for 15 years. He started sailing in J-24's and J-80's. He took classes at Harbor Sailboats and crewed on race boats to gain experience.

In 2004 he bought his first Columbia 30, *Uncontrollable Urge*. He liked offshore racing better than buoy racing. The first *Uncontrollable Urge* was hull #3 and had numerous modifications for offshore racing. The first *Uncontrollable Urge* had sailed some 27,000 miles.

After winning class in the 2012 Pacific Cup Gilmore decided he had taken the *Uncontrollable Urge* as far as it could go. Columbia had just come out with a new "pocket" racer, the Columbia 32. It had several modifications to make the boat more offshore friendly such as a stern compartment for the life raft and a real navigation station. Gilmore worked with the builder for two years to develop the boat. *Uncontrollable Urge* was hull #3 and he went to Newport often to oversee the construction.

Gilmore co-owns a Pogo 8.5 in Oslo and has sailed in the Baltic. He took some ideas from that boat to incorporate into the new *Uncontrollable Urge*.

The new *Uncontrollable Urge* had sailed approximately 10 times prior to the 2013 Islands Race and had gone a maximum of six miles off Newport Beach, CA.

The Islands Race crew consisted of:

Mike Skillicorn who has 30 years sailing experience. He is an Engineer.

Doug Pajak who has Fire/Medical training

Craig Williams owner of Olsen 40 *Uproarious*

Ryan Georgianna who has 18 years sailing experience.

Vince Valdes from Columbia Yachts.

Gilmore was a medical technician in the Army and had medic training.

Prior to the Islands Race the crew had two crew meetings and went over watch schedules, safety gear, logistics, and weather briefings. During the race they had the Yellowbrick tracker and a Spot tracker. The AIS was in receive only mode. The only thing onboard that did not work well were the instrument lights which flickered on and off.

Four of crew members are currently US Sailing Safety at Sea certified.

Everyone was wearing their inflatable safety harness and all were tethered in while racing.

There were two large flat fenders with clips on the deck. These served as seat cushions and could also be used as emergency flotation.

Gilmore had the ISAF Offshore Regulations and a spreadsheet with a list of the required safety gear.

On Friday, 8 March, the crew met at a doughnut store for a last crew briefing. The watch schedule, MOB, *Uncontrollable Urge* liability statement, and weather for the race were discussed. They went through the medication list for everyone aboard.

Gilmore's brother, who usually navigates, did not do the race. Gilmore had sprained his ankle and had a bad shoulder prior to the race. Gilmore was navigating. He was using a scopolamine patch to prevent seasickness.

The crew was excited about the race and knew what weather to expect.

There was a squall prior to the start so the crew put a double reef in the main. There was no rush and no worries getting ready for the start. The object of the race was to learn about the boat and do the required long race/sail to qualify for Transpac.

At the west end of Catalina the true wind speed was 18-20 knots with seas of 6'-8'. At dusk *Uncontrollable Urge* was past the west end of Catalina. After rounding the west end, Gilmore had to go below as his ankle was bothering him. The boat was running well with 13-18 knots boat speed. The helm was easy one handed steering.

As *Uncontrollable Urge* approached San Clemente Island the helmsman noticed more lateral momentum on the tiller (more force on the tiller). Instead of one hour rotations on the helm the crew switched to 20 minute rotations as steering was more tiring. The crew members were still tethered to the boat and had been since the start of the race.

After rounding the west end of Catalina Island the stitching on the Velcro webbing on the life sling started to fail. This was a new life sling and it had to be put below so as not to go overboard accidentally.

Before the rudder failure Pajak slumped down next to Gilmore below and said these were the toughest conditions he ever had seen.

The watch schedule was started after the start of the race and the crew members were resting. The watches had three crew members on deck. No one was seasick yet and all were excited.

An hour before the rudder failure the helm felt momentarily "mushy" and the speed slowed. Gilmore surmised they had picked up kelp. Twenty minutes before the rudder failure the boat broached. The sail plan was a double reefed main and a #1 jib (105%).

Gilmore's waypoint was 1 ½ miles off the west end of San Clemente Island. As they approached San Clemente Island the crew was talking about which sail to set next. *Uncontrollable Urge* was one of the outside boats in the fleet. Gilmore was counting down the mileage to the waypoint as driving was difficult.

Valdes was below resting in the port bunk and heard two bangs. Williams was on the helm and Georgianna was trimming the main. At 2130 *Uncontrollable Urge* lost its rudder. For 10 seconds the boat kept going in a straight line and then it was obvious the rudder was gone.

Gilmore hailed the USCG on VHF 16 just after the rudder was lost. The USCG asked if they were in immediate danger and Gilmore said no. The USCG told Gilmore to activate the DSC, which he did.²

On the old *Uncontrollable Urge* the crew had practiced with no rudder as it was transom hung and easy to do.

During a sail in Long Beach Gilmore had been sailing on Columbia 32 hull #1 when they broached and the rudder broke. At the time the true wind speed was 8-12 knots with 2'-3' swells and without a rudder could sail to 60 degrees true wind angle. Columbia evaluated the failure before building the rudder for the new *Uncontrollable Urge*. The rudder for the new *Uncontrollable Urge* had a much larger stock which looked "reasonable" to Gilmore.

The crew tried to sail with a double reefed main and #1 jib, but the boat was not balanced. They changed to a storm sail and #3 jib which worked. They were making 1-1 ½ knots of boat speed on a S to SW heading. They were using the engine to help keep the speed up and were no longer racing.

The luff tape on the #3 jib ripped/failed. That jib was no longer viable and the boat could no longer be controlled.

Gilmore believed he could get a tow from Sea Tow in Avalon.³ A tow from another boat was ruled out as too dangerous because of the wind and sea conditions. He thought 200' would be too close for two sailboats in

² After the initial interview Gilmore wished to include the following additional information: Gilmore hailed the USCG on VHF16 *immediately* after the rudder was lost and gave them information on location, crew, boat name, type of emergency, and safety gear. The boat was yawing heavily- Gilmore was seated on the sole with two hands braced against a companionway. Gilmore received calls from two boats, (one of which was *Innocent Merriment*) saying that they were standing by- he thanked both.

The boat was drifting with a SOG of 0.0-0.1 knots and was approximately 2 miles from the tip of San Clemente. Gilmore was aware that SOG at low speeds could be inaccurate, and estimated that with an error of 3X they had a minimum of five hours. He discussed the option of immediately abandoning ship with one crew member, and they both agreed that with the sea state a better option would be to sail out and get a tow. The USCG asked if they were in immediate danger...which he did. He was asked if they needed assistance and stated that at this time *Uncontrollable Urge* did not. He requested that USCG help with establishing a commercial tow. Throughout the emergency, Gilmore was in constant contact with USCG giving them updates (e.g. location, speed, boat activities {setting storm sails, using anchors as drogues, inability to steer with emergency rudders, etc}).

the seas, wind, and after dark. He was worried about the two rigs locking together. Another worry was that the engine on the tow boat would not be strong enough to make any headway.⁴

After the #3 jib failed the crew lost control of the boat and they started to drift towards the island. Gilmore then became sea sick. Georgianna was largely incapacitated with sea sickness after control of the boat was lost.

The watch captains, Williams and Skillicorn, decided to motor and took the sails down. They began to built the first emergency rudder which was a bunk board on a pole.

Gilmore called for towing assistance and was told by the USCG the response time would be 20 hours due to sea-state.

Gilmore requested assistance from any boat on VHF 16. There was no response.

The wave action made it impossible to steer and that rudder was abandoned. They then deployed a warp with a bucket from the bow and used the engine, but that did not work either. There was not enough flow over the keel and the engine could not keep the boat going fast enough.

Gilmore had the crew deploy both anchors from the bow. The crew had faked the rode, the anchors were already assembled and there were no problems with deployment.

The second emergency rudder was the boom with a carbon fiber battery hatch. The boom whipped wildly around and lightly injured one crew member. They still did not have steerage and were continuing to drift towards the island. The anchors set and held for about 20 minutes. Gilmore then saw the anchors dragging on his Expedition software but had difficulty determining how long before they would hit the island as speed over ground from the GPS did not match the drift rate on Expedition. The GPS is inaccurate at low speeds.

³ After the initial interview Gilmore wished to include the following additional information: Gilmore believed he could get a Sea Tow...enough to make any headway. USCG notified Gilmore the response time would be 20 hours for a commercial tow due to sea state.

⁴ After the initial interview Gilmore wished to include the following additional information: One of the standby boats called to ask whether they needed to continue to stand-on. Pajak was below when the call came through and voiced his concern to Gilmore over a rescue attempt with the stand-on boat. Gilmore agreed as the boat at that time was getting under control, a tow had been requested (via USCG) from Avalon, and he believed he had at least five hours margin. Attempting a tow from the stand-on boat would be quite hazardous given the rolling of *Uncontrollable Urge*, the sea and wind state, possibility of kelp disabling the tow boat, the darkness, unknown capability of the stand-on's engine, and a lee shore. There was a strong possibility that the rescue attempt would end up with two boats in trouble. Based on this, he thanked the stand-on boat and released them from standby.

The crew cleared the deck of lines and discussed whether it was possible to take the rig down.

He did not know what resources the USCG had or how close they were. They needed advice in the bad situation in which they found themselves.

At ½ mile offshore with the anchors dragging the crew spotted the surf line. Gilmore told the USCG the crew had spotted the surf line. They brought the abandon ship bag on deck. The USCG told Gilmore they were 40 minutes away.

He told the USCG they were preparing to abandon ship. They intended to stay aboard as they had read the US Sailing Farallones Race Panel report, but wanted the USCG to know that they may be in the life raft.

The life raft was in the stern compartment with a painter attached to the boat. When the crew deployed the raft it swept overboard to the end of the painter away from the boat. It was dark and they tried to pull it back to the boat but were unsuccessful. They tried to fire two red parachute flares. On one they could not get the plastic housing off. The second one worked. Gilmore checked the AIS and saw no ships or boats in the area. He took the red rescue laser out of the ditch bag and activated it but it did not seem to be effective.

At 0.4 miles offshore the boat had its first grounding just outside the surf line. It struck hard and was probably on a rock out cropping. The boat was headed towards the beach and Gilmore told the USCG they were abandoning ship. The USCG told him to get the hand held VHF. He took the VHF from the MOB bag and left the cabin as he was afraid of being trapped below. He wanted to put in the hatch boards and told the crew there was beach ahead. He was not tethered.

Williams had been driving and was on the starboard side. Williams said "I think this one is going to roll us". Some the crew manually activated their life jackets. A wave about 20' high crested and broke on the boat. It did not roll the boat completely, but almost. Gilmore tried to stay aboard was thrown overboard and trapped under the boat with his legs tangled in the backstay lines. He estimated they were 0.3 miles from the shore. "Get back aboard" was Gilmore thought. Another large breaking wave made it impossible for him to get back on the boat.

Williams was overboard on the starboard side still tethered in. The boat rolled on him. Gilmore tried to swim back to the boat, but could not. The mast rigging was wrapped around Williams. Valdes said "I think he's drowning".

Another large wave swept the life jacket off Gilmore's head. He had a Spinlock Deck Vest harness with crotch straps. Five of the six persons aboard had the same failure with their auto-inflating harnesses.

Gilmore was swimming towards the shore even though he could not see it. One crew member made it to the life raft as it was approximately forty meters away from the boat. Gilmore never saw the raft. He made it to shore and crawled out of the surf. He was wearing a dry suit which had filled up with water. This made it difficult to stand up. He still had the hand held VHF.

Georgianna was tethered in and was trapped. He grabbed the quick release on his harness to get out from under the boat. He swam to the life raft at first, but decided the shore was closer and so swam to shore. He was the second person on the beach after Gilmore and was in bad shape with hypothermia. He and Gilmore shared warmth. Georgianna's harness did not have any problems.

Pajak was not tethered and was thrown off the boat. He swam to the life raft and got in the raft. The raft was full of water, but floating. He got out of the raft and held on through the surf. He was the third person ashore and was in the best shape. He brought flares out of the survival bag in the raft.

Gilmore hailed the USCG via handheld VHF and the signal was strong. He surmised he was talking to an aircraft. He told them there were three persons on the beach and three missing.

Valdes and Skillicorn were on the wave side of the boat and held on to the life lines and winches to stay aboard. They thought everyone was in the life raft. Skillicorn took in some salt water. Valdes yelled into the cabin to make sure no one was below.

Williams was caught in his tether and wreckage. Valdes tried to pull him back aboard and could not. Valdes tried to get Skillicorn's attention, but it was loud with the boat in the surf. He cut Williams loose. At this point Williams was conscious.

Valdes and Skillicorn tried to ride the boat into the beach. When the water got higher in the cockpit they needed to leave the boat and used the flat fenders for a raft.

Gilmore was so happy to see Skillicorn and Valdes coming out of the surf.

Pajak saw a light on the left, southward on the shore. It was a glow stick that Williams had with him. Pajak went to investigate and saw a life jacket light and Williams face down in the water. The flotation chamber was pulled over his head. Pajak gave him CPR. Unable to resuscitate Williams, Pajak returned back to the group on the beach.

Gilmore called the USCG and said all were accounted for with one deceased.

The crew shared warmth, and used the raft to make a shelter. All were hypothermic. The USCG said they were 20 minutes away. During this time they saw a fixed wing aircraft dropping life rafts offshore.

Gilmore was worried about Georgianna who was the most affected by hypothermia and so kept close to him. Hearing a helicopter, Gilmore handed Georgianna a flare to fire and it went off horizontally. The second flare fired correctly and the helicopter was alerted to their position.

Pajak was still in good shape and coordinated the ground rescue. Georgianna was evacuated first. The helicopter had to evacuate the crew while hovering in the air so each lift took about 15-20 minutes.

It was a 40 minute flight back from the island and there were ambulances waiting at the tarmac. Most of the crew's internal body temperatures were 94 degrees.

Gilmore answers to the question "What would you do differently?"

1. Flares are dangerous. The printed directions on the flare are small and unreadable in the dark. They are hard to open when fingers are cold. A Very pistol is better.
2. Have heating patches in the ditch bag.
3. The life raft light was useless. The raft light should be a strobe and brighter.
4. The Spinlock harness light is not bright enough.
5. Harnesses/Lifejackets need to be functional in large waves and surf.
6. If you are going to be grounded, stay on the high-side of the boat but do not be tethered. Wrap your arms around strong points and stay low in the boat.
7. For offshore boats should have a strong second rudder that can be immediately deployed.
8. He had no sea anchor aboard.
9. When the boat was drifting towards the beach the crew talked about getting in the raft and decided that it would be worse.
10. Glow sticks are highly visible and should be in the ditch bag.
11. Clearing the deck of lines and the boom saved lives as the boat entered the surf.
12. People need to rest even if no sleep possible.
13. There should be training on how to work with other boats, e.g. towing, talking on the radio.
14. How to talk to the USCG to accurately tell them what is happening- they may not be aware of a sailboats capabilities or limitations. .
15. Crewmembers that need glasses should have a spare on their person.

Gilmore stressed they were not racing hard. They wanted to learn the boat and get their required sea time for their Transpac entry.

The rudder post broke just below the lower bearing at the bottom of the boat. Columbia manufactured the rudder post, not a third party.

Trauma counseling was provided by City of San Diego and was helpful for the crew. It helped set the stage for later mental recovery. The yacht clubs were essential in helping coordinate media coverage so that the crew could grieve in privacy.

Uncontrollable Urge Interview

With crewman Doug Pajak

May 13 2013

By Betty Sherman

Pajak is 46 and has been a serious sailor for 15 years. He has sailed casually since a child. He has been a surfer for 23 years.

Pajak had only sailed with Williams and Valdes a few times. He had sailed with Gilmore and Skillicorn on other boats for a long time. He was called one or two weeks prior to the race to replace Chris Gilmore for the Islands Race crew.

The crew had been reviewing weather reports for a week prior to the race and knew what the conditions would be. They reviewed man overboard procedures as well. Each crew member had their own auto-inflating harnesses and tethers.

Pajak went to Newport Thursday evening in the van with Williams' wife and others. The crew members were in bed by 2200 and got plenty of rest the night before.

Friday morning the crew met with Chris Gilmore for another weather briefing.

As they left the harbor and hugged Balboa Island they heard someone on another boat say "those guys are in for a rough night".

They checked in with the Race Committee 45 minutes prior to the start. At about 2 minutes before the start the wind went to nothing. They had previously put in the second reef while a squall came through the starting area.

After the start the crew had a discussion whether to tack mid channel. They had a single reef for the crossing to Catalina Island. The crew members were doing 90 minute watches, i.e. every 90 minutes they were changing positions and someone was resting. Everyone was able to drive.

It was rough as they tacked up the leeward side of Catalina Island and they were overpowered. Driving and trimming the mainsail were very uncomfortable as the seat braces were too close for comfort. Before the west end of Catalina Island they put in the second reef.

They rounded the west end of Catalina Island around 1800 with Pajak driving. On the reach to San Clemente Island the instruments were not syncing with the computer and the instrument lights were periodically going out. Without the instruments or compass lights driving was more difficult.

Between Catalina Island and San Clemente Island the true wind speed was 24-26 knots and the swell was 6'-8' and off the beam. The seas were confused with an occasional 10'-12' set.

The boat speed was 13-17 knots with the main barely working and a #1 jib set. The wind was building as they approached San Clemente Island.

Pajak got off watch at 1930. As they approached the west end of San Clemente Island it was uncomfortable below as there was so much heel. Gilmore was having a hard time hanging on in the navigation station. The boat was taking swells over the bow continually.

The crew had closed the companionway sliding hatch and had one hatch board in place. There was water dripping from the deck hardware bolts and water was coming in the keel box.

While Pajak was resting below Valdes came into the cabin after driving 40-45 minutes and said they needed to shorten the time on the helm. Valdes immediately went to the starboard bunk to rest. Skillicorn took over and drove for 20 minutes.

The instruments lights were still going out periodically and the light from the computer was distracting to the helmsman. At about 3 miles from the west end of San Clemente Island the crew were talking about the boat and which sail to set next. Pajak recommended resting before setting the spinnaker and Valdes concurred. They were about 20 minutes from their downwind waypoint.

Suddenly Skillicorn yelled "all hands on deck the rudder is gone". Pajak and Valdes immediately went on deck and Gilmore called the USCG. They ascertained the boat was not sinking or taking on water nor was anyone hurt. The boat was rounding up and the crew members were getting thrown around.

With Williams and Pajak on the leech and Skillicorn at the mast they took the mainsail down. They set the storm trysail in its place and kept the #1 jib set. The #1 is a 100% jib.

As the boat was still not under control they set the #3 jib. After a short time the #3 ripped at the luff and was no longer useable. At this time the crew knew they could not sail, and the boat was approximately 1½ miles from land.

They deployed two anchors with 150' and 200' of rode respectively. The crew knew the anchors would not hit bottom yet, but were set off the bow to try to keep the bow into the waves.

Pajak knew the boat was headed towards the beach and was concerned about hitting the rocks. Gilmore told the USCG they were in no immediate danger and were in the process of setting the anchors.

Their first attempt to make a rudder used a bunk board and was unsuccessful.

Just after this attempt to make a rudder the anchors hit bottom and held briefly. They took the boom off the tried to make another rudder with a carbon battery hatch. The boom was swinging around wildly and hit Pajak in the nose. The GPS antenna was almost wiped off the stern rail by the boom.

They next tried to kedge using the engine to run forward towards the anchors. This was too hard.

The swells were getting steeper and Pajak could hear the surf. He guessed it was 500 yards ahead. The crew put all lines below so no one would be tangled up. Everyone was calm.

Gilmore was talking to the USCG continually. The USCG had not launched yet and Gilmore said "prepare to abandon", after Pajak warned Gilmore about the breakers. There was a life raft garage in the stern. When they opened the raft garage the raft inflated and took off to the end of the painter and the ballast bags filled. The painter snapped and the raft was gone.

The USCG now said they were on the way. Gilmore asked where the ditch bag was and took the portable VHF out per the USCG's instructions. Pajak never saw the ditch bag again.

The anchors were slowing the boat's progress toward the island, but they were never really holding. At about one mile from the beach Pajak went below and got his ID and some Cliff bars. Georgianna and Gilmore got some of their personal gear too.

Suddenly the keel hit a rock and the boat heeled over but righted. The keel hit another rock and heeled even more. They were not in the surf line yet but there were 8'-10' swells. After hitting the second rock Pajak could see the surf line.

Pajak released his tether as he was comfortable in the water. He was afraid of being tangled in the rigging and/or having the composite carbon fiber boat break apart in the surf.

Pajak manually inflated his Spinlock harness and at that time everyone else inflated too. Pajak was on the port side of the boat when Williams said "I think this one's going to roll us". Williams was on the starboard side away from the wave.

The boat rolled on top of Pajak and he could hear muted noises like the rig was snapping. He thinks he was being held onboard and under water by a stanchion. His intention was to stay on the boat, but found himself in the water and unable to see the boat. Pajak's life jacket was out place with the safety harness straps in place, but the flotation chamber was over his head and inflated on his left side.

As Pajak is a long time surfer he felt at home in the water and was comfortable swimming into the beach. Prior to finding himself in the water he had cinched up the cuffs, neckband, ankle cuffs, boots, and gloves as tightly as possible. He still had his hat on too.

Pajak was swimming and using the waves to push him towards the shore. He found himself in a rip current and saw the life raft light at some distance away. He swam to the raft, but could not get in as he had to hold his life jacket in place. At some point after holding onto the outside of the raft he was able to get inside and rest. Eventually he saw white water and boulders. On the beach he saw a little light. Pajak's head lamp failed after three dunkings and the Spinlock harness light did not work so he was unable to signal to the person on the beach.

With the waves receding, he cut the raft ditch bag out of the raft, jumped in the water and got onto the beach. He found Gilmore and Georgianna there sitting close together. Georgianna was shaking heavily and visibly very cold. Gilmore still had the hand held VHF and the raft ditch bag was intact. Georgianna was given the flares to signal the USCG when they arrived.

At this point they had not seen any of the others. Pajak was not too cold and went looking up and down the beach. To the right he saw nothing, but to the left he saw an orange light floating. He walked down the rocks which were slippery with kelp and bird droppings. His legs were getting ripped up so he went into the water again. He swam out, grabbed the light, which was an orange glow stick, and swam back to shore. He then saw another white light further out in the water and swam to that location.

With the light reflecting off the rocks he saw Williams' body and swam to him. Williams was face down in the water with his harness flotation chamber on one side of his head. Pajak rolled him over and found him unresponsive. Pajak tried to do CPR, but as the waves were still breaking over them it was too hard. He got

the body up on the rocks and continued to do CPR. Pajak finally realized that he had done all he could do to try to resuscitate Williams.

He went back and told Gilmore and Georgianna that Williams was gone.

They then saw two lights drifting in towards the beach. It was Skillicorn and Valdes struggling in the surf. The conditions were calming down somewhat, but Skillicorn and Valdes were visibly tired. Valdes' legs had cramped up and he was unable to walk out of the water. Skillicorn was sitting on a submerged rock resting. Pajak swam out to Skillicorn and helped him to the beach.

The raft had floated ashore and they were able to use it as a shelter. The crew noticed an airplane and helicopter off of the island, but the aircraft did not seem to see them. Georgianna fired the first flare which went off horizontally towards the cliff. The next flare Georgianna shot correctly signaled the aircraft.

The helicopter dropped a rescue swimmer without a basket initially. Pajak told the swimmer that there were three crew with hypothermia, one possible injury (Valdes severe leg cramps), and one deceased. When all of the crew had been lifted into the helicopter the swimmer retrieved Williams' body.

It was very cramped in the helicopter, and had there been any more than six crew members the USCG would have had to make two trips. The USCG gave the crew first aid and took their names. When they arrived at the USCG station in San Diego ambulances were waiting on the tarmac. Pajak refused medical service.

He told the flight crew what had happened and went into the USCG office to wait for the Coroner. Pajak phoned his fiancé, Jodi, who brought dry cloths. She arrived at around 0230.

The Coroner arrived and said that the cause of death was drowning.

What worked and what did not:

The crew worked together. All were calm and talked about how to go about each task. There was a prioritized plan in place.

There was a disconnect between Gilmore below decks and the crew on deck. Gilmore was the only one who could see their physical location on the computer.

The Sunday after the accident Gilmore, Skillicorn, Georgianna, and Pajak met and went over what had happened. On Monday the entire crew met again.

When Pajak was giving the USCG information on the crew he found that he did not know enough about each individual. This was also a problem when he spoke with the Coroner. He recommends that each person have a complete list of the crew and their emergency contact information.

Putting the lines and loose gear below kept the crew from getting entangled when the boat rolled. Likewise ditching the boom ensured that no one was hit as the boat entered the surf.

Four out of five Spinlock harnesses failed and the harness lights did not all work.

Everyone on the crew needs a knife that they can use in the dark. Everyone needs to know where all of the tools are located.

Pajak could not get the plastic housing off one of the SOLAS flares.

Offshore boats need a “real” emergency rudder, easily deployed in rough conditions. Not a pole and bunk board.

Uncontrollable Urge Interview

With crewman Ryan Georgianna

May 14 2013

By Betty Sherman

Georgianna is 30 years old and has been sailing since he was 12 years old. He bought his first boat when he was 13.

He grew up racing PHRF with his Dad as well as Olson 30's, Hobie 33's and other sport boats. When he was 17 he had a life guarding job that turned into a teaching sailing job for three years. He sailed mostly in the Chesapeake.

In college he was a rower. After college he sailed on a J-109 in North Carolina and bought a Nacra cat. He sailed in Raleigh, NC and Virginia Beach, VA. In July 2011 he moved to San Diego and was a regular crew on Craig Williams' Olson 40, *Uproarious*.

He sailed with Williams from November 2011 until Williams' death. They did local offshore races together.

Williams called Georgianna to crew on the Islands Race two or three weeks before the start. The *Uncontrollable Urge* crew needed one more person as Chris Gilmore could not go on the race. Georgianna was excited to sail on a new boat and with a crew that had a proven track record in offshore races.

One week prior to the race some of the crew went to Newport on the weekend to familiarize themselves with the boat and the safety gear.

The night before the race the crew drove to Newport with Williams' wife.

The next morning as they motor sailed to the starting area it was rainy and windy. They were motoring slowly and everything seemed fine.

After the start they were the third boat out of the breakwater behind the Beneteau 36.7 and the Flying Tiger. A rotation was set up prior to the start with the crew switching between five positions every 90 minutes. Georgianna was driving around the west end of Catalina Island.

At this time they had a second reef in the mainsail as the true wind speed was 25-26 knots. Their boat speed was between 9-13 knots. As the foot braces were not correctly placed driving and trimming the main were uncomfortable after awhile. Just after rounding the west end of Catalina Island Georgianna felt the helm go

“mushy” and felt there was probably kelp on the rudder. The kelp eventually cleared itself and the helm went back to normal.

The crew had eaten lunch, but had nothing for dinner. Georgianna felt seasick and probably would not have eaten dinner.

Georgianna was wearing a Spinlock harness with crotch straps and tether. He was wearing foul weather gear, a wool sweater, and boots and was warm enough.

At the west end of San Clemente Island Williams was driving. Suddenly Williams said “the rudder is gone”. The boat did not stop and Georgianna does not think they hit anything.

Gilmore immediately contacted the USCG. Valdes said that he and Gilmore had sailed a boat like this before without a rudder and so thought they could do it again. Valdes took charge and the crew took the mainsail down and put up the storm trysail. They still had the #1 jib set (a 100% jib).

With this sail combination they would sail for awhile and then a wave would hit and the boat would round up. The crew then took the #1 jib down and set the #3 jib. This sail combination felt about the same to Georgianna.

At this time Georgianna was trimming the main and Williams was trimming the jib. The boat was tacking back for forth and then the #3 jib blew up. The crew tried dragging buckets from the stern to steer, but this did not work. After the #3 blew up they turned the engine on to try to motor.

The first attempt at making an emergency rudder used a bunk board. This bunk board snapped in two and was discarded. Williams had the idea to drop the anchors off the bow to slow their progress towards the beach. After 45 minutes to one hour after the rudder breaking, the anchors seemed to be catching and holding.

For 15 minutes the anchors seemed to be holding, but then it was obvious they were dragging. They were still trying to use the motor and hoping that Sea Tow would arrive from Avalon. Valdes opened the raft compartment and the raft flew out. The raft went to the end of the painter and the ballast bags filled. They tried to pull the raft back, but could not.

The crew tried to use the boom as a rudder with a battery hatch attached, but it was swinging wildly through the cockpit. San Clemente Island was getting close.

The crew tried to kedge using the engine and anchors. They also wanted to reassure themselves that the anchors were still attached. Kedging was too hard against the swells and wind.

The surf line was getting closer and the crew cleared the deck of all running rigging and loose gear. Gilmore called the USCG and said they needed to be picked up.

The anchors were caught in kelp and slowed the boat’s progress towards the beach, but they never really caught. The keel was hitting the bottom in the troughs. At 300-400 yards from the Island everyone inflated their vests except Georgianna.

Williams spotted a large wave and said “this one is going to roll us”. Georgianna was tethered on the starboard side near the companionway and held onto the cabin top winch and companionway. The starboard side was the leeward side of the boat. No one was panicking.

When the boat rolled Georgianna felt gear hitting him and was at the end of his tether. Rigging was hitting him and he realized he was underneath the boat. While still underwater he pulled the quick release on his tether. He was shot out on the aft starboard side of the boat and swam towards the stern. His life jacket had auto inflated and was in the correct position.

He was able to see the mast in two pieces and hanging over the side aft of amidships. Williams was pulling himself back onboard, but there was too much rigging in his way.

Georgianna was treading water and saw an aircraft drop a life raft in the water out to sea of their position. He then saw *Uncontrollable Urge's* life raft and started to swim towards it. He realized he could stand up on the bottom and heard Gilmore on the shore. After trudging through the pebbles and sand he reached the beach.

Gilmore still had the hand held VHF and told the USCG there were at least two survivors. Pajak arrived walking on the beach from the north. Shortly thereafter Pajak left their position when some lights were spotted. When Pajak returned he told them that he had found Williams dead. Valdes and Skillicorn swam ashore a significant amount of time later. The raft had blown ashore and the crew members were using it as a wind break and shelter. Georgianna shot off two of the small flares from the life raft ditch bag. One went off horizontally towards the cliff in back of them and the other one went off correctly. The helicopter crew told Georgianna that they never saw the flares.

Even though Georgianna still had all his gear on he was shaking heavily and hypothermic. When he was in the hospital later his temperature had shot up above normal.

What would you have done differently:

Georgianna did not think a drogue would have made a big difference.

Georgianna was the only one aboard who had not taken the US Sailing Safety at Sea course.

***Uncontrollable Urge* Interview**

With crewman Mike Skillicorn

May 14 2013

By Betty Sherman

Skillicorn is 53 years old and has sailed since age ten. His first boat was an El Toro. When his family moved to Santa Cruz he built a 12' wood sailboat to use in the harbor. In high school he sailed Lasers and Banshees. While in Santa Cruz he worked as a boat mechanic at The Helmsman Yacht Center fixing and sailing Cal sailboats.

Skillicorn sailed multihulls while attending college in San Diego. After a hiatus from sailing for a few years, Skillicorn began sailing offshore in the early 1990's. He crewed on various boats during that period, a J35, a

Catalina 30, and a Baltic 38 doing bay and coastal racing. In the late 1990's through 2005 he crewed on a Henderson 30, *Fast Twitch*, and an Olson 40, *Uproarious*. In 2005 he skippered *Uproarious* in Transpac.

Skillicorn sailed on the first *Uncontrollable Urge* with owner James Gilmore, Chris Gilmore, and Brian Vanderzanden. They sailed mostly point to point offshore races together. They participated in typical Southern California offshore races, Puerto Vallarta, Cabo San Lucas, Coastal Cup, N2E, Transpac, and Pacific Cup. In 2010 they won their class in Pacific Cup.

After 2010 Gilmore and crew looked at several types of boats that would be drier below, sail better to windward, and have a real navigation station. They worked with yacht designer, Tim Kernan, and Columbia builder, Vince Valdes, to get the design features they wanted in a new boat.

Columbia C32 hull #1 was built in 2012. Gilmore wanted hull #3. The whole crew were very involved in the below deck and above deck layout.

While James Gilmore, Valdes, Chris Gilmore, and Skillicorn were on a test sail on hull #1 the rudder broke in approximately 10 knots of wind with the A2 set. They dropped the A2, set a jib, and successfully sailed without the rudder. Skillicorn believes the rudder was a prototype to get the boat in the water and was not intended to be the production rudder.

The Islands Race was a qualifier for the Transpac Race requirements. They wanted to see if any changes to the boat were needed prior to Transpac.

Their plan was to sail Transpac with their usual crew of four. For the Islands Race Gilmore had a sprained ankle and his brother Chris Gilmore was not able to make the race. As the Islands Race forecast was for windy and rough conditions they added some additional crew making for a crew of six. The intent was for Gilmore, Skillicorn, and Valdes to assess the boat and determine what changes, if any, would be required.

After the beat to the west end of Catalina Island, the crew found the wind and swells were on the beam of the boat. As the boat weighed only 4000 pounds it was a rough, wet ride. The rudder was loading up due to the large swells on the beam.

The instrument lights were periodically going out making it difficult to steer after dark. They were following the light of a boat whose course was outside of the other boats in the fleet heading towards San Clemente Island. Skillicorn was driving on the approach to San Clemente Island. Upon reaching the island, Skillicorn and Williams traded helm and main trim positions. Williams was driving when the rudder broke.

Valdes immediately took charge and they dropped the main and set the storm trysail in its place. The #1 jib was also taken down and the #3 jib set. The crew thought they were making progress down the island with the trysail and #3 jib sail combination. After sailing with this set up for 15-20 minutes a wave broke over the side of the boat tearing off the bottom two-thirds of the #3 jib. At this point they started the engine and attempted to motor away from the island with little or no success.

Valdes tightened the twin backstays in the transom center and lashed a carbon bunk board between the backstays to steer the boat. This bunk board snapped in the swells and was discarded.

Williams suggested setting the anchors from the bow to slow their progress towards the beach and to hold the bow into the wind and swells. At 150' of depth Skillicorn and Valdes set the first anchor and then the second anchor from the bow. The anchors were not holding properly and the crew suspected that they were caught tearing through the kelp. At times the anchors did appear to hold so Gilmore was considering a watch rotation while they were anchored as the storm passed. After roughly twenty minutes, the anchors began slipping again. Skillicorn thought their boat speed was about 0.1 knots towards the shore.

The crew then removed the boom, lashed a battery hatch cove to it and used it as a rudder. The assembly was lashed down to the transom between the backstays. While attempting to lash the front end of the boom to the tiller for stability, Pajak was hit in the face twice by the end of the boom. Due to the severe swell action, three persons together were unable to hold the end of the boom safely to where it could be lashed in a manner to steer the boat. For safety they had to jettison the boom from the boat.

With the anchors still holding somewhat, Valdes and Skillicorn crawled to the bow and tried to kedge using the engine full throttle to pull forward to the anchors. By the time forward progress led the boat directly above the anchors, the boat speed was essentially zero speed over ground so it was decided not to try again as no progress was being made into the wind and waves.

At that point, Skillicorn looked below and asked Gilmore how long it would be before the USCG arrived and Gilmore said the USCG was not coming. At this point Skillicorn felt they could not save the boat. Gilmore decided to abandon ship. They cleared the deck of all running rigging and loose gear. Gilmore called "mayday" on VHF 16.

The anchors were dragging, but slowed the boat's progress towards the beach and bought the crew time to plan ahead. Gilmore came on deck and they deployed the life raft. Once the raft garage was opened the raft went out to the end of the painter and the ballast bags filled. Due to the heavy surf and strong winds, the crew could not pull the life raft back to the boat.

All six crew were in the cockpit with Skillicorn tethered to port, Valdes tethered to port, Georgianna and Pajak on the transom helping Gilmore with the raft, and Williams tethered to starboard. No one was in a hurry or panicked. A few crew members went below to get their personal gear in order. Skillicorn believes that everyone had inflated their PFD's by this point.

When the large swell hit, Skillicorn was looking aft and hanging vertically from the lifelines. The boat's keel came down on a rock. He saw Valdes next to him. The waves were hitting the boat with enough force that he had to hold on to the boat so as not to go to the end of his tether. It was then that the raft broke loose. The boat had rolled past 90 degrees to starboard.

Since the wave had taken Gilmore, Pajak, and Georgianna off the boat, Skillicorn thought everyone was dead except him and Valdes. Skillicorn was watching for the next wave to hit and realized the rig was gone. Suddenly Valdes went to the starboard side and yelled "it's Georgianna, I think he is drowning" and "I cut him free".

Skillicorn had not realized there was anyone else with the boat. He had inhaled water and was not able to hear Valdes. Valdes came back to the port side cabin top winch and Skillicorn told Valdes to grab the large, flat fender, they had been using as a cockpit cushion. The boat was sinking and the cabin was half full of

water. They could not ascertain the distance to the island but believed the boat was the safest place to be at that time.

In another half hour Skillicorn was submerged up to his chest in the cockpit. He and Valdes stayed with the boat until one foot of the cabin top was above the water. At that point, the cabin top was no longer protecting them from the force of the waves washing over the boat. They were both getting colder and Skillicorn started to feel the standing rigging from the mast wrapping around his feet.

Skillicorn and Valdes made their way to the port side of the transom, locked arms and used the fender as a kickboard to swim into the shore. As the water was so cold Valdes' legs were badly cramped. Swimming in was very difficult as the surf was big and they were cold and tired. Skillicorn inhaled water again as they were pounded by the surf.

Skillicorn estimated that he and Valdes were in the water for 45 minutes including the time in the flooded cockpit. They had no idea how far away the shore was from their position. Finally Skillicorn's legs hit the top of a rock outcropping. Within a couple of minutes they were at the shore in a foot or two of water. Valdes' legs were so cramped that he could not walk ashore. Skillicorn sat on a submerged rock to expel the water from his lungs and to get his breath back.

Upon reaching the shore, Skillicorn was surprised to see Gilmore, Pajak, and Georgianna alive. Gilmore told Skillicorn and Valdes that Williams was dead and had washed up on the beach. At that point Skillicorn realized that Valdes had mistaken Georgianna for Williams as he cut him away from the boat.

The raft had washed ashore and they were able to invert it and use it for a shelter from the wind. The crew saw an airplane doing a search pattern out to sea. Soon they saw the helicopter that would rescue them. Pajak went out of the raft to talk to the USCG rescue swimmer.

When Skillicorn was at the hospital later his internal body temperature was approximately 94 degrees.

In hindsight:

Skillicorn would have tried to use the engine from the beginning when sailing with the trysail and #3 jib.

He would have tried the jury rigged boom rudder earlier with the engine instead of waiting until later.

Setting the anchors was the right thing to do as was clearing the deck of all lines and loose gear before they entered the surf line.

They needed more floatation than the life jacket provided to get to shore in those conditions.

Skillicorn maintains his Safety at Sea Certificate and had recently taken the US Sailing Safety at Sea Seminar in January 2013.

Uncontrollable Urge Interview

With crewman Vince Valdes

By telephone – May 6, 2013

By John Jourdane

Vince Valdes is 46, and has been sailing from a very young age. He owns Columbia Yachts, and sailing is in his genes. He sailed in his first Ensenada Race at age 11. He has decades of offshore experience, including a first overall win in the 2001 Transpac Race on the Sydney 40, *Bull*.

Valdes sold Gilmore his first *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia 30, which went on to win its class in the 2010 Pacific Cup. He worked with James Gilmore on the construction of the new *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia Carbon 32. He sailed on the boat a few times doing trial sails.

Valdes was not planning to crew on *Uncontrollable Urge* for the Islands Race. A week before the race, Chris Gilmore, James Gilmore's brother, had to drop out because of a new job. Gilmore asked Valdes to do the race since the weather looked rough and Valdes was very experienced.

(In first person – Valdes speaking)

Our goal for the race was to get to know the boat better and finish this qualifier for the Transpac Race to Hawaii. The crew knew it would be a windy race, but we all felt ready to deal with it.

Gilmore had a sore shoulder and a sprained ankle. The crew was down to five physical workers on deck. Gilmore stayed below working with the computer, chart plotter and weather information.

There was a squall before the start, and some sail changes, but once we started things went well. The sail around West End Catalina Island went smoothly. The crew was working well together and the morale was high. We watched several whales near the West End before dark. The wind was steadily building on the reach to San Clemente Island, blowing 25 knots with gusts to 32 knots. We had boat speeds as high as 15-18 knots.

As the sun went down we approached San Clemente Island. It was very dark, and the waves refracting off the island made the seas very confused. It was like the waves were coming from six different directions. The instrument lighting was acting up. It kept turning on and off. It was very disorienting making steering difficult.

Everyone was wearing inflatable PFDs and tethers when on deck. I wore SOSpenders and a double tether. I believe everyone else had Spinlock PFDs and tethers.

We were nearing the island, and I was down below in the starboard quarter berth getting some rest, having just come off watch. Pajak was also below, and Gilmore was below on the centerline seat watching the computer and chart plotter – calling out boat speeds.

Conditions were rough. There was a loud bang and the boat had a big wipeout and was laid out flat. I shouted "what the hell was that?!" to Gilmore and Pajak – they both responded "I don't know". We struck something. The boat came back up, and then started sailing again for about a minute. Then there were two more loud bangs. I think that the rudder was damaged in the strike/broach and the sailing loads finished it off.

The rudder is designed and built to exceed ABS and ISO specifications. It is a solid carbon post, not a tube, and can't be compressed.

Someone yelled "The rudder is gone!" I ran on deck. Everyone was kind of in shock and just looking around. There were two reefs in the main and a blade up for a jib. Without the rudder the boat was out of control. We decided to take off the main and put it below. We hoisted the storm jib as a trysail on the mast and boom. The sea conditions were really bad and the boat was tossing about wildly.

We tried to steer the boat in this configuration for a while but the jib seemed to be too big, so I went forward and took it down, and replaced it with a small #3 jib from Gilmore's first boat. It was an old sail and shredded in the heavy wind and wild seas. I went forward and took the sail down and pushed it in through the foredeck hatch.

After trying unsuccessfully to steer the boat with the main (storm jib) and jib, Gilmore made the call to deploy the anchors. An anchor was handed up through the main hatch and I went forward to deploy the first anchor. Gilmore then asked that the second anchor be deployed and I went forward again and deployed the second anchor. Skillicorn went forward with me to deploy the anchors. I deployed them from the bow. They were aluminum anchors and seemed to get caught in the heavy kelp off the point.

I tried to build a rudder from a carbon bunk board set off the stern. It quickly broke. We then took off the boom and lashed it to the tiller with a carbon battery cover as a blade attached to it. We started the engine and tried motoring using the boom to steer. But the seas were too wild and it the boom whipped around wildly.

The anchors would catch once in a while, but the waves kept moving us towards the shore.

Gilmore was below, on the radio, talking with the Coast Guard and other boats. The boat started dragging again. I suggested that we clear the deck of all running rigging so no one would get entangled in it.

We continued to drag closer to the shore. Gilmore gave the order to deploy the life raft. I went aft and removed the life raft compartment door. I stepped forward to say we're ready to go. We took another large wave, I looked back and the raft had slid out of the box and inflated. Williams and I tried to pull it back to the boat, but the ballast bags had filled, and we didn't have enough strength to bring it in.

The boat was slowly backing toward shore in the surf. The two bow anchors dragging. A large wave crashed on the boat and turned it nearly beam-on to the seas. Another big wave hit and the boat rolled well past 90 degrees. The mast snapped (it may have hit the seafloor).

After this large wave, Skillicorn and I believed we were the only ones left on board. It appeared all others had washed away. Skillicorn had swallowed a lot of water, and was not doing well. I went down below and retrieved a flat fender that we had been using as a seat pad earlier in the day. I remembered where it was because I had been resting on it when I was off watch. I handed that fender to Skillicorn and told him to hang onto it, and that it was his ride to the beach.

I went back below to get another fender, for myself, but the boat was full of water with lots of stuff floating around. It looked too dangerous so I went back to the cockpit. The waves were breaking over the boat.

Prior to the large wave that rolled the boat, everyone had inflated their PFDs. Skillicorn and I decided to undo our tethers, so if the boat rolled, we wouldn't be caught under it. We were riding the boat for several waves

when one caught me and I was thrown across the cockpit. That's when I found Williams in the water over the starboard side. He was tangled up in the mast and rigging, and couldn't get free. I tried to lift him on to the boat but I couldn't move him. I tried to time my lift with the waves and roll him into the boat but that didn't work either. I told Williams that he was tangled and I was going to cut him loose. I cut the lines around him along with his tether. Another wave hit, the boat rolled, and when it came back up, Williams was free. He was wearing a PFD and I felt he had a chance to make to shore.

I went forward where Skillicorn had been hanging on. After a while the boat was settling lower in the water and was sinking. We could see and hear the waves, but could not see the shore. We didn't know how far away it was. I told Skillicorn that we should stay with the boat until we can swim over the lifelines without getting hung up. When the boat settled down some more Skillicorn swam over the aft lifelines and I followed. I was the last one off the boat. Skillicorn and I hung on the flat fender, and made our way to the shore. As we neared the rocks, the surf diminished, and we were able to climb up the rocks to the beach.

Pajak met us at the beach and we crawled up away from the waves. Everyone was there but Williams. Pajak said he found Williams face-down in the surf, and he was gone. We were all stunned, shocked, and very cold. Someone found the life raft, brought it up, and we all climbed under it to try to stay warm.

We could hear the Coast Guard helicopter, but couldn't see it. Georgianna and Gilmore let off a couple flares, and finally the Coast Guard found us. They lowered a couple rescue crew, checked us over, and lifted each of us off the island.

We were taken to San Diego, put into ambulances, and taken to different hospitals to be checked out.

What would I have done differently?

HAVE AN EMERGENCY RUDDER ABOARD! In a situation like this, lots of wind and big seas, spinnaker poles and floor boards don't work. If we had had another rudder that we could deploy in wind and rough seas, we could have easily motored away from the lee shore.

We had 2 ½ to 3 hours from the time the rudder broke until we hit the shore. If we had an alternate method of steering the boat, we could have avoided the tragedy.

Appendix 10: Designer Interview

May 7 Interview with Tim Kernan

By John Jourdane

Tim Kernan designed the Columbia Carbon 32, *Uncontrollable Urge*. He also designed the previous *Uncontrollable Urge*, a Columbia 30; both boats were built by Columbia Yachts in Santa Ana, California.

A little background on Tim; He graduated from New York University and the Landing School. Tim worked as chief engineer and lead design associate for Robert Perry Yachts Designers (1995-2000). He then worked as a

consultant to Morelli and Melvin Design and Engineering, designers of the record-breaking maxi-cat *Playstation* (2000-2003). He founded Kernan Yacht Design in 2003.

Tim has designed a variety of boats, from the 14' Stealth Dinghy to the Santa Cruz 37, the Outbound 52 cruising sloop, the 68' racing sled *Peligroso*, and several power boats and power cats.

Interview in the first person:

James Gilmore bought one of the Columbia 30s, and named it *Uncontrollable Urge*. The boat was quite successful on the race course, winning its class in the Newport to San Diego Race, and second in class in the Ensenada Race. In 2010 the boat entered the Pacific Cup from San Francisco to Hawaii and won its class.

I had taken the Columbia 30 design and updated it to a light-weight composite carbon fiber offshore racer. Gilmore was interested in a new boat, and the 32 seemed to fill the bill. It had a high speed planning hull with a fine entry, efficient high aspect lifting keel and composite carbon fiber rudder, a sophisticated sail plan set on a carbon fiber bow sprit.

The boat was designed to compete against the Melges 32 and the Flying Tiger 10 meter, as a fun, trailerable, offshore sport boat.

It is a simple boat with a small navigation station on centerline, a small galley, and a couple quarter berths.

The Columbia 32 is lighter than the Columbia 30 with more volume below, and more form stability. It has positive floatation and is self-righting. It is a better offshore boat than the 30. The hull is a carbon fiber composite with more robust ring frames to support the lifting keel. It has a water-tight bulkhead. It has a dedicated compartment aft for the life raft and there is also a substantial compression post for the deck-mounted mast step.

The 32 has an inboard diesel with a retractable drive. The boat displaces about 4,000 pounds with 1,750 pounds ballast. It has an inboard rudder instead of the transom-hung rudder on the Columbia 30. The rudder is a carbon fiber composite and has a standard hollow rhomboid post. It is designed well above ABS requirements.

Vince Valdes of Columbia Yachts was very conscientious about the construction and wanted a stronger rudder for *Uncontrollable Urge*. He had the post built of solid carbon fiber instead of the hollow post. He wanted a post that could not compress under load. The rudder that finally went into *Uncontrollable Urge* was way over built.

Valdes was on the boat when the rudder broke. He said he heard two loud bangs before the rudder loss. Gilmore said the helm went mushy just before the loss. I think they hit something, either heavy kelp or possibly a seal. I was sailing the race on the Santa Cruz 70, *Warpath*, and we encountered kelp and saw several seals near the point on the island.

The SC 70, *Grand Illusion*, said they hit a shark. And the SC 70, *Retro*, said they hit something big, but didn't know what it was.

I was able to check out *Uncontrollable Urge* after the accident. The rudder post was broken, but not at the hull. There was about 8 to 10 inches of post sticking out beyond the hull. There was also an indentation and dent in the hull behind the rudder. It is my feeling that they hit something big, and when the rudder broke, it caused the dent in the hull.

What can we learn from the accident? I think the ISAF Safety requirement for emergency steering is too vague. It states crews must be aware of alternative methods of steering the yacht in any sea condition in the event of rudder loss. At least one method must have been proven to work on board the yacht. An inspector may require that this method be demonstrated.

Boats sailing offshore need a real rudder replacement in case of loss, not a spinnaker pole and floorboard that they have tried in a calm harbor. I prefer the cassette style that can be quickly deployed in rough conditions.

On my 68' design, *Peligroso*, we put two sets of gudgeons for cassettes on the transom, one on each side. The boat carries two lightweight Columbia 30 carbon blades with tillers attached to the tops. The boat is easily steered with one or both rudders.

The ISAF should consider changing the wording of the emergency rudder requirement to make it more specific.

Appendix 11: John Jourdane's Sydney-Hobart Rescue Report

John Jourdane's journal from the 2008 Sydney-Hobart Race on the Spencer 65, *Ragtime*. Here is what happened.

It was the first night out of Sydney, and the wind was blowing steady 25 knots with gusts to 30. The seas were 4 to 6 feet, and we were sailing south under spinnaker in the East Australian Current, giving us a 3-4 knot push. The sun had gone down and it was dark. We saw a flare behind us, and I went below to listen to the radio. The yacht, *Georgia*, a Farr 53 out of Melbourne, came on with a Mayday. They had hit something, and lost their rudder. The collision tore a hole in the boat where the rudder used to be. They were taking on water, couldn't stop in inflow. They gave their position, and we saw that they were about 3 miles behind us. We called the communications boat, and said we were dropping our sails, and were on our way, upwind under power, to help them. The yacht, *Merit*, a Volvo 60 out of Brisbane, came up and said they were close and were heading to *Georgia* also.

Merit arrived first and was discussing the rescue of *Georgia's* crew when we arrived on scene. When we arrived *Georgia* was so low in the water, the navigation light were occasionally underwater. We saw that *Merit* had the rescue underway, so we said we would stand by, and brought our life raft on deck, and prepared to help anyway we could. *Merit* motored well to leeward of *Georgia*, who had already inflated their life raft, which was in the water to leeward. The *Georgia* crew attached the life raft painter to an anchor rode, put seven of their 14 crew in it. The wind and seas blew the raft downwind, and *Merit* maneuvered to catch it. The seven crew from *Georgia* climbed onto *Merit*, and they attached an anchor rode from *Merit* to the raft, and *Georgia* pulled the raft back, now with a line connected to *Merit*, and a line connected to *Georgia*. The remaining seven crew climbed into the raft, and let out the rode as *Merit* pulled them back. When all the crew were aboard *Merit*, they detached the line connected to *Georgia*. The rescued crew had been in the

water, and were cold and wet. *Merit* took them all below, and gave them warm clothes and hot drinks. About 10 minutes later *Georgia* sank.

Merit headed toward the coast to rendezvous with a Coast Guard launch. We, on *Ragtime*, were cleared by the Race Committee to resume racing. We motored to the position we had stopped racing, set sails, and headed for Hobart. It was a perfect rescue of a sinking crew. We can all learn from the calm, professional work of the *Merit* crew.

Appendix 12: Disposition of the Crew's Life Jackets and Tethers

<i>Summary of Personal Gear in Use at the Time of the Uncontrollable Urge Accident</i>							
Date: 1 June 2013							
Name	Tether	Jack line	Means of Release	PFD	Crotch Straps	Floatation Chamber went over head	Date of Manufacture
Craig Williams	West Marine - ISAF Safety Hook with quick release.	Starboard	Not released, tether cut by Valdes	Spinlock Deck Vest	No	Yes	May-07
James Gilmore	Spinlock brand	N/A	Not tethered	Spinlock Deck Vest	Yes	Yes	Oct-11
Doug Pajak	West Marine - ISAF Safety Hook with quick release.	N/A	Not tethered	Spinlock Deck Vest	No	Yes	Oct-09
Ryan Georgianna	Spinlock brand tether but was modified with a quick release shackle attached to the tether with a piece of spectra	Starboard	Pulled quick release	Spinlock Deck Vest	Yes	No	Jun-07
Mike Skillicorn	West Marine tether ~ 5-years old. Triple with a quick release	Port and holding onto port life lines	Pulled quick release after boat rolled	Spinlock Deck Vest	Not wearing	Yes	Jul-07
Vince Valdes	Unknown	N/A	Not tethered	SOSpende r	No	No	Unknown

Appendix 13: USCG Report

Case Report

Case #: 629326 Case Opened: 03/08/2013 11:55:00 PM Case Closed:

Status: Closed - Agency Action Complete

Title: SAR Disabled Vessel/Uncontrollable Urge/ 32 00.289 N 118 37.687 W West side of SCI/090527ZMAR13

Incident Type/Subtype: SAR Disabled Vessel

SMC/IC: Sector San Diego

Contains Activities:

A. Activity ID:4545937 Title: Incident Management - SAR Disabled Vessel/Uncontrollable Urge/ 32 00.289

Incident Summary: The 30-foot sailboat Uncontrollable Urge crew issued a mayday call and activated their Digital Selective Calling feature on their VHF marine radio around 9:26 p.m., Friday, after the sailboat's rudder failed and they began

drifting toward San Clemente Island during the Islands Race. The crew initially stated they were not in need of assistance and declined assistance from both the Coast Guard and other boaters involved in the race. The sailors requested assistance from a commercial salvage company, however they were unable to launch due to weather conditions. The sailors attempted to anchor the vessel just after 11 p.m., however the anchor would not catch and the vessel drifted closer to the island. An MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter crew launched from Coast Guard Sector San Diego and Coast Guard Cutter Edisto was diverted to the scene. The boat entered the surf line and was broken apart by the waves, forcing the crew to abandon the vessel. The helicopter crew hoisted the six sailors and brought them to the Sector where they were met by emergency medical personnel for transport to a local hospital. The weather on scene was 8-foot swells with 10-knot winds with a small craft advisory in effect.

MISLE Attachments:

Documents: : 629326CASEDOCS.PDF; : VSLUNCONTROLABLEURGE.JPG; : Part1.wav; : Part2.wav; : Part3.wav; : Part4.wav; : Part5.wav; : Rescue 21 Timeline.PDF; B. Activity ID:4545938 Title: Incident Management - SAR Disabled

Vessel/Uncontrollable Urge/ 32 00.289

Incident Summary: At 0527Z, the JHOC received a call on CH16 from the Vessel Uncontrollable Urge reporting they lost their rudder and then became adrift. Uncontrollable Urge who was involved in a sailboat race refused help from other race boats and made the decision to wait for Sea Tow's arrival on scene however Sea Tow was unable to make the trip out until morning due to a small craft advisory in effect. The Uncontrollable Urge was 1.3 NM from the north tip of SCI shore when incident occurred and began quickly dragging anchor. JHOC diverted CGC

Edisto at 1129 lcl and have a 0500 local ETA. D-11 also diverted CG1708 to get eyes on and assess the situation.

MISLE Attachments:

Documents: : SV UNCONTROLLABLE URGE.pdf; : 20130313150943025.pdf;

C. Activity ID:4546001 Title: Resource Sortie - Search and Rescue

D. Activity ID:4546013 Title: Resource Sortie - Search and Rescue

P
FM: SECTOR SAN DIEGO
TO:
INFO:
BT
UNCLAS //N16130//
SUBJ: SAR/DISABLED VESSEL/UNCONTROLLABLE URGE/WEST SIDE OF SCI, LAT 33 00.289 N LONG 118 37.687 W
PERIOD:082355Z MAR 13 - 171058Z JUN 13

1. SITUATION.

A. CURRENT STATUS: CLOSED - AGENCY ACTION COMPLETE

B. NOTIFICATION: 09 Mar 2013; VIA R21 - VHF/FM CHANNEL 16; POB:6 ADULTS:6 CHILDREN:0

C. NARRATIVE: THE 30-FOOT SAILBOAT UNCONTROLLABLE URGE CREW ISSUED A MAYDAY CALL AND ACTIVATED THEIR DIGITAL SELECTIVE CALLING FEATURE ON THEIR VHF MARINE RADIO AROUND 9:26 P.M., FRIDAY, AFTER THE SAILBOAT'S RUDDER FAILED AND THEY BEGAN DRIFTING TOWARD SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND DURING THE ISLANDS RACE. THE CREW INITIALLY STATED THEY WERE NOT IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE AND DECLINED ASSISTANCE FROM BOTH THE COAST GUARD AND OTHER BOATERS INVOLVED IN THE RACE. THE SAILORS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM A COMMERCIAL SALVAGE COMPANY, HOWEVER THEY WERE UNABLE TO LAUNCH DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS. THE SAILORS ATTEMPTED TO ANCHOR THE VESSEL JUST AFTER 11 P.M., HOWEVER THE ANCHOR WOULD NOT CATCH AND THE VESSEL DRIFTED CLOSER TO THE ISLAND. AN MH-60 JAYHAWK HELICOPTER CREW LAUNCHED FROM COAST GUARD SECTOR SAN DIEGO AND COAST GUARD CUTTER EDISTO WAS DIVERTED TO THE SCENE. THE BOAT ENTERED THE SURF LINE AND WAS BROKEN APART BY THE WAVES, FORCING THE CREW TO ABANDON THE VESSEL. THE HELICOPTER CREW HOISTED THE SIX SAILORS AND BROUGHT THEM TO THE SECTOR WHERE THEY WERE MET BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL PERSONNEL FOR TRANSPORT TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL. THE WEATHER ON SCENE WAS 8-FOOT SWELLS WITH 10-KNOT WINDS WITH A SMALL CRAFT ADVISORY IN EFFECT. - ACTIVITY #: 4545937

AT 0527Z, THE JHOC RECEIVED A CALL ON CH16 FROM THE VESSEL UNCONTROLLABLE URGE REPORTING THEY LOST THEIR RUDDER AND THEN BECAME ADRIPT. UNCONTROLLABLE URGE WHO WAS INVOLVED IN A SAILBOAT RACE REFUSED HELP FROM OTHER RACE BOATS AND MADE THE DECISION TO WAIT FOR SEA TOW'S ARRIVAL ON SCENE HOWEVER SEA TOW WAS UNABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP OUT UNTIL MORNING DUE TO A SMALL CRAFT ADVISORY IN EFFECT. THE UNCONTROLLABLE URGE WAS 1.3 NM FROM THE NORTH TIP OF SCI SHORE WHEN INCIDENT OCCURRED AND BEGAN QUICKLY DRAGGING ANCHOR. JHOC DIVERTED CGC EDISTO AT 1129 LCL AND HAVE A 0500 LOCAL ETA. D-11 ALSO DIVERTED CG1708 TO GET EYES ON AND ASSESS THE SITUATION. - ACTIVITY #: 4545938

D. INVOLVED SUBJECTS:

PERSON NAME: DOB: ROLE:

PERSON NAME: DOB: ROLE: OTHER

VESSEL NAME: UNCONTROLLABLE URGE VIN: 1173359 CALL SIGN: WDD6073 FLAG: UNITED STATES

GROSS TONS: 8; LENGTH: 30 CLASS/TYPE/SUBTYPE: RECREATIONAL/GENERAL/GENERAL LPOC: NPOC:

WATERWAY NAME: PACIFIC OCEAN; ACOE:

WEATHER:

WEATHER DTTM: 09MAR2013 09:09:00(Z); WEATHER DESC: WATERS FROM SAN MATEO POINT TO THE MEXICAN BORDER EXTENDING 30 TO 60 NM OUT INCLUDING SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND-; LOCATION: WEST SIDE OF SCI; WEATHER SOURCE: NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN DIEGO CA; WIND SPEED: 15 KTS; WIND DIR: 270 T; GUST SPEED: 25 KTS; CEILING HT: 2500 FT; AIR TEMP: 55 F; VISIBILITY: 10 NM; SKY CONDITION: SCATTERED; WATER CONDITION SOURCE: NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE SAN DIEGO CA; WATER TEMP: 57 F; WAVE HT: 5 FT; SWELL HT: 8 FT; SWELL DIR: 270 T; SWELL PERIOD: 10 SECONDS;

2. ACTION TAKEN.

A. 090527Z MAR 13: INITIAL NOTIFICATION - AT 0527Z, THE JHOC RECEIVED A CALL ON CH16 FROM THE VESSEL UNCONTROLLABLE URGE REPORTING THEY LOST THEIR RUDDER AND THEN BECAME ADRIPT. UNCONTROLLABLE URGE WHO WAS INVOLVED IN A SAILBOAT RACE REFUSED HELP FROM OTHER RACE BOATS AND MADE THE DECISION TO

WAIT FOR SEA TOW'S ARRIVAL ON SCENE HOWEVER SEA TOW WAS UNABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP OUT UNTIL MORNING DUE TO A SMALL CRAFT ADVISORY IN EFFECT. THE UNCONTROLLABLE URGE WAS 1.3 NM FROM THE NORTH TIP OF SCI SHORE WHEN INCIDENT OCCURRED AND BEGAN QUICKLY DRAGGING ANCHOR. JHOC DIVERTED CGC EDISTO AT 1129 LCL AND HAVE A 0500 LOCAL ETA. D-11 ALSO DIVERTED CG1708 TO GET EYES ON AND ASSESS THE SITUATION.

B. 090548Z MAR 13: OS1 (OU) BRIEFED SMC AND D11.

C. 090548Z MAR 13: OS1 BRIEFED BY SEC SD OS1 REGARDING CASE OF A DISABLED S/V 1.5NM OFF THE COAST OF SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND, THEY ARE CURRENTLY IN THE ALERT PHASE.

D. 090610Z MAR 13: JHOC CONDUCTED ORM GAR OF 21 HIGH OF 6 IN ENVIRONMENT.

E. 090710Z MAR 13: RESPONSE RESOURCE REQUESTED

F. 090723Z MAR 13: RCVD CALL FROM THE S/V UNCONTROLABLE URGE REPORTING THEIR ANCHOR IS NOT HOLDING AND NOW THEY ARE .3 NM FROM SHORE.

G. 090725Z MAR 13: OS1 RECEIVED NOTIFICATION FROM OS1 THAT THE SITUATION IS WORSENING, REQUESTED THE CG1708 BE DIVERTED TO ASSIST DUE TO THE VESSEL DRAGGING ANCHOR AND SEATOW IS NOT ABLE TO RESPOND DUE TO SEA STATE. CURRENTLY THERE IS A SMALL CRAFT ADVISORY BEING FORECASTED FOR THE AREA.

H. 090730Z MAR 13: CG1708 DIVERTED TO VSL TO GET EYES O/S.

I. 090730Z MAR 13: CAPT SYNDER/CDR CAMP DRM HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND CONCURS WITH DIVERSION OF THE C-130 AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED THE ABOUT THE UNSCHEDULED LAUNCH OF THE SEC SD READY HELO.

J. 090743Z MAR 13: MH60T 6033 SECTOR SAN DIEGO LAUNCHED

K. 090743Z MAR 13: MH60T 6033 SECTOR SAN DIEGO DELAYED DUE TO AWAITING FURTHER INFORMATION/INSTRUCTIONS

L. 090745Z MAR 13: RESPONSE RESOURCE REQUESTED

M. 090745Z MAR 13: HC130H 1702 AIRSTA SACRAMENTO LAUNCHED

N. 090747Z MAR 13: OS1 CALLED FASFAC SD TO ENSURE THEIR ARE NOT HOT AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND. NO HOT AREAS REPORTED.

O. 090750Z MAR 13: CG6033 A/B ENROUTE TO WEST COVE WEST SIDE OF SCI. 04 POB, 27 GAR WITH A HIGH OF 7 IN EVENT COMPLEXITY AND ENVIRONMENT.

P. 090803Z MAR 13: RCVD CALL FROM VSL REPORTING THEY ARE IN THE BREAK WATERS OF THE ISLAND AND TRIED TO DEPLOY LIFERAFT WHICH WAS SWEEP AWAY AND HAVE ALSO HIT BOTTOM. CAPT OF VSL REPORTS CREW IS ABANDONING VSL.

Q. 090803Z MAR 13: HC130H 1702 AIRSTA SACRAMENTO ON SCENE AT 090803Z MAR 13

R. 090810Z MAR 13: CG1708 DEPLOYED DMB.

S. 090816Z MAR 13: CG1708 RCVD REPORT FROM 3 CREWMEMBERS THAT MADE IT TO SHORE WITH THE 4TH COMING OUT OF THE WATER. 02 POB STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR.

T. 090830Z MAR 13: D11 COMMAND CENTER RECEIVED A 406 EPIRB IN THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT IN POSN 32-59.87N 118-35.00W.

U. 090830Z MAR 13: SEC SD OS1 REPORTS THAT THE VESSEL IS IN THE BREAKWATER OF THE ISLAND AND HAS RAN AGROUND. THE CAPTAIN OF THE VESSEL IS IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE C130 THAT ARRIVED ON SCENE, CAPT OF THE VESSEL HAS TO ABANDON SHIP. FOUR INDIVIDUALS MADE IT ASHORE, TWO ARE MISSING.

V. 090830Z MAR 13: TARGET LOCATED AT 090830Z MAR 13

W. 090832Z MAR 13: MH60T 6033 SECTOR SAN DIEGO ON SCENE AT 090832Z MAR 13

X. 090833Z MAR 13: TARGET LOCATED AT 090833Z MAR 13

Y. 090833Z MAR 13: CG6033 O/S.

Z. 090836Z MAR 13: CG1708 REPORTS ALL 6 INDIVIDUALS ARE ON SHORE, 1 IS DECEASED AND THE OTHER 5 ARE SUFFERING FROM MILD HYPOTHERMIA AND MINOR CUTS AND SCRAPES.

AA. 090844Z MAR 13: SEC SD OS1 REPORTS THAT ALL 6 PEOPLE ARE ASHORE, FIVE ARE SUFFERING FROM HYPOTHERMIA AND ONE IS DECEASED.

AB. 090850Z MAR 13: OS1 BRIEFED SMC LCDR REGARDING THE RESULTS FOR CASE.

AC. 090858Z MAR 13: RCVD CALL FROM MR. STATING HE IS THE EVENT COORDINATOR FOR THIS "ISLANDS RACE" FROM LA TO SD. MR. WAS REQUESTING ADDITIONAL INFO ON CREW OF THE VSL.

AD. 090902Z MAR 13: OS1 (D11 SU) BRIEFED LCDR (AIR STATION SACRAMENTO).

AE. 090915Z MAR 13: OS1 BRIEFED CAPT. HATFIELD (DR) ALONG WITH CAPT. SNYDER (SMC).

AF. 090920Z MAR 13: OS1 BRIEFED (DRM) CAPT. SNYDER, CAPT SNYDER (DR) AND RDML SCHULTZ REGARDING FINDINGS OF THE CASE. CONCERNS THAT CAME UP ARE PAO AND MEDIA COVERAGE.

AG. 090931Z MAR 13: HC130H 1702 AIRSTA SACRAMENTO DEPARTED SCENE

AH. 090933Z MAR 13: CG 6033 COMPLETED THE HOIST OF ALL 06 POB.

AI. 090940Z MAR 13: MH60T 6033 SECTOR SAN DIEGO DEPARTED SCENE

AJ. 091004Z MAR 13: CG 6033 ON DECK SSD, TRANSFERRING PATIENTS TO EMS ON HELO PAD. CORONERS EN ROUTE FOR DECEASED CREW MEMBER. JHOC AWAITING NAMES OF ALL 5 POB AND THE 1 DECEASED INDIVIDUAL.

AK. 091007Z MAR 13: MH60T 6033 SECTOR SAN DIEGO SORTIE ENDED

AL. 091012Z MAR 13: BRIEFED LCDR REGARDING THE EPIRB HIT THAT IS COMING FROM THE LOCATION NEAR THE INCIDENT OF THE S/V UNCONTROLABLE URGE. ALSO INFORMED HER WE HAVE RELEASED A UMIB FOR THE EPIRB AS A SAFETY PRECAUTION, EVENTHOUGH THE LOCATION IS CLOSE TO THE S/V UNCONTROLABLE URGE.

AM. 091022Z MAR 13: LT (D11 CDO) BRIEFED D11 PAO.

AN. 091028Z MAR 13: OS1 (D11 SU) BRIEFED MIFC IWO.

AO. 091033Z MAR 13: BRIEFED THE CG1708 TO DIVERT TO TO THE POSTION SOUTH OF SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND FROM WHERE THE EPIRB HITS ARE COMING FROM, AND TO ALSO TO PASS OVER THE ORGINAL DISTRESS POSTION. CG1708 REPORTS THEY RECEIVED EPIRB HIT FROM THE S/V AND ARE SURE THAT THESE EPIRB HITS ARE IN FACT THE SAME VESSEL.

AP. 091045Z MAR 13: D11 RESUMES TACON OF 1708. D11 DIVERTS THE 1708 TO TWO POSITIONS IVO SCI WHERE THE D11 CC RECEIVED 406 EPIRB ALERTS.

AQ. 091050Z MAR 13: OS1 CONTACTED OS2 (SEC SD SU) REQUESTING INFORMATION ON SMI, MARINE CASUALTY AND ENVIROMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREA POTENTIAL.

AR. 091122Z MAR 13: NOK NOTIFICATION FOR MR. MADE BY CDR CONLEY (SMC) TO MRS. OF DECEASED CREW MEMBER.

AS. 091131Z MAR 13: NEWS RELEASE

1 DEAD, 5 RESCUED FROM SURF AFTER SAILBOAT ACCIDENT

SAN DIEGO - ONE PERSON IS DEAD AND FIVE OTHERS WERE RESCUED BY A SAN DIEGO-BASED COAST GUARD AIRCREW, SATURDAY, AFTER THEIR BOAT DRIFTED INTO THE SURF AND BROKE APART NEAR SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND, CALIF., DURING A SAILBOAT RACE.

THE 30-FOOT SAILBOAT UNCONTROLLABLE URGE CREW ISSUED A MAYDAY CALL AND ACTIVATED THEIR DIGITAL SELECTIVE CALLING FEATURE ON THEIR VHF MARINE RADIO AROUND 9:26 P.M., FRIDAY, AFTER THE SAILBOAT'S RUDDER FAILED AND THEY BEGAN DRIFTING TOWARD SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND DURING THE ISLANDS RACE.

THE CREW INITIALLY STATED THEY WERE NOT IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE AND DECLINED ASSISTANCE FROM BOTH THE COAST GUARD AND OTHER BOATERS INVOLVED IN THE RACE. THE SAILORS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM A COMMERCIAL SALVAGE COMPANY, HOWEVER THEY WERE UNABLE TO LAUNCH DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.

THE SAILORS ATTEMPTED TO ANCHOR THE VESSEL JUST AFTER 11 P.M., HOWEVER THE ANCHOR WOULD NOT CATCH AND THE VESSEL DRIFTED CLOSER TO THE ISLAND. AN MH-60 JAYHAWK HELICOPTER CREW LAUNCHED FROM COAST GUARD SECTOR SAN DIEGO AND COAST GUARD CUTTER EDISTO WAS DIVERTED TO THE SCENE.

THE BOAT ENTERED THE SURF LINE AND WAS BROKEN APART BY THE WAVES, FORCING THE CREW TO ABANDON THE VESSEL.

THE HELICOPTER CREW HOISTED THE SIX SAILORS AND BROUGHT THEM TO THE SECTOR WHERE THEY WERE MET BY EMERGENCY MEDICAL PERSONNEL FOR TRANSPORT TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL. THE WEATHER ON SCENE WAS 8-FOOT SWELLS WITH 10-KNOT WINDS WITH A SMALL CRAFT ADVISORY IN EFFECT.

###

DATE: MAR 9, 2013
COAST GUARD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENT SAN DIEGO
CONTACT: PETTY OFFICER 3RD CLASS <MAILTO@USCG.MIL>
OFFICE: (619) 278-7025
MOBILE:

SAVING LIVES AND GUARDING THE COAST SINCE 1790.
THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD -- PROUD HISTORY. POWERFUL FUTURE.
FOLLOW US:

FLICKR <[HTTP://WWW.FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/COAST_GUARD/COLLECTIONS/72157625771527789/](http://www.flickr.com/photos/coast_guard/collections/72157625771527789/)> TWITTER
<[HTTP://TWITTER.COM/USCOASTGUARD](http://twitter.com/uscoastguard)> FACEBOOK <[HTTP://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/USCOASTGUARD](http://www.facebook.com/uscoastguard)> YOUTUBE
<[HTTP://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/USCGIMAGERY](http://www.youtube.com/uscgimagery)> WORDPRESS <[HTTP://COASTGUARD.DODLIVE.MIL/](http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/)> OUR RSS
FEED <[HTTP://WWW.PIERSYSTEM.COM/GO/FEED/4007/DT/117479/RSS20/](http://www.piersystem.com/go/feed/4007/dt/117479/rss20/)>
VIEW THIS DOCUMENT ONLINE <[HTTP://WWW.PIERSYSTEM.COM/GO/DOC/4007/1719415/](http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/4007/1719415/)>
USCG

U.S. COAST GUARD DIGITAL NEWSROOM <[HTTP://WWW.PIERSYSTEM.COM/GO/SITE/4007/](http://www.piersystem.com/go/site/4007/)>
VISIT THIS LINK TO UNSUBSCRIBE <[HTTP://WWW.PIERSYSTEM.COM/GO/UNSUBSCRIBE/4007/ACCX7TI_MK-
VES7721276AJZTDQPGLJJU64X3NHDTB_](http://www.piersystem.com/go/unsubscribe/4007/accx7ti_mk-ves7721276ajztdqpjlju64x3nhdatb_)>

AT. 091146Z MAR 13: OS1 RECIEVED UPDATE THAT CG1708 REPORTED THEY CHECKED OUT THE "B" POSITION AND THE "E" SOLUTION FOR THE EPIRB AND DID NOT FIND ANY VESSELS IN THE AREA. CG1708 TACON WAS SHIFTED TO SEC SD FOR TAKING WITH REMAINING CASES OF DISABLED VESSELS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAILING RACE.

AU. 091203Z MAR 13: OS1 BRIEFED LCDR REGARDING EPIRB CASE AND SHE CONCUR TO CLOSE OUT THE CASE/UMIB DUE TO THE VESSEL LOCATION ON YELLOWBRICK.COM CORRELATES TO THE "E" SOLUTION OF THE EPIRB. THE CG1708 STATED THAT THEY HEARD AN EPIRB ALERT COMING FROM THE VESSEL, AND THE VESSEL CREW ADMITTED TO ARMING THE EPIRB DURING THE ABANDON SHIP EVOLUTION.

AV. 091206Z MAR 13: LT CALLED CDR WILLIAMS (PAC-37CF) TO REQUEST THE TACON OF CGC STEADFAST FROM PACAREA TO SEC SD TO ASSIST WITH SAR. CDR WILLIAMS APPROVED REQUEST.

AW. 091208Z MAR 13: INFORMED SEC SD CDO THAT THEY CAN NOW CANCEL THE UMIB DUE TO D11 SMC CORRELATES THE EPIRB WITH THE S/V UNCONTROLLABLE URGE.

AX. 091337Z MAR 13: INITIAL:

091243Z MAR 13: AT 2126U, SEC SD RECEIVED A DISTRESS CALL AND DSC ALERT BY THE S/V UNCONTROLABLE URGE STATING THEY SUFFERED A CASUALTY ON THEIR RUDDER DURING THE "ISLANDS RACE" SAILING EVENT AND WERE DRIFTING TOWARD SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND (SCI). THE S/V DID NOT REQUEST ANY ASSISTANCE BY USCG AND DECLINED AID BY MARINERS PARTICIPATING IN THE RACE AS WELL. THE S/V HAS A SEA TOW MEMBERSHIP AND REQUESTED USCG TO CONTACT THEM; HOWEVER, SEA TOW WAS UNABLE TO RENDER ASSISTANCE DUE TO THE SEA STATE. AT THAT TIME, SEC SD ESTABLISHED A COMMUNICATION SCHEDULE WITH THE S/V IN CASE THEIR SITUATION WORSENE. AT APPROXIMATELY 2310U, THE S/V WAS UNABLE TO SET ANCHOR AND WAS DRIFTING CLOSER TO SCI, APPROXIMATELY .5NM WEST OF SCI.

SEC SD DIVERTED THE CGC EDISTO THAT WAS 35NM AWAY WITH AN ETA OF 2 HRS. SEC SD READY HELO WAS LAUNCHED WITH AN ETA OF 45 MIN. THE CG-1708 WAS DIVERTED FROM A SCHEDULED PATROL TO PROVIDE ON-SCENE COVERAGE UNTIL OTHER CG ASSETS ARRIVED ON-SCENE TO RENDER ASSISTANCE. THE CG-1708 ARRIVED ON SCENE TO FIND THAT THE S/V HAD ENTERED THE SURF NEAR THE ISLAND AND RAN AROUND. THE CAPTAIN OF THE VESSEL RADIOED THE CG-1708 TO INFORM THEM THAT THEY HAVE TO ABANDON SHIP DUE TO THE VESSEL BREAKING UP. THE CREW OF THE VESSEL LATER REPORTED THAT THE WHOLE CREW WAS ACCOUNTED FOR ASHORE, BUT ONE CREW MEMBER DIED. DETAILS REGARDING THE DEATH OF THE CREWMEMBER ARE UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME. SEC SD RESCUE HELO ARRIVED ON SCENE AND TRANSPORTED FIVE CREW MEMBERS AND ONE DECEASED CREWMAN SAFELY TO SAN DIEGO, CA. THE FIVE CREW MEMBERS WERE TAKEN TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT OF MINOR HYPOTHERMIA. NOK NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE BY SEC SD.

BRIEFED: LCDR (ADRM), CAPT SNYDER (DRM), CAPT HATFIELD (DR), RDML SCHULTZ (D), AND DUTY D11 PAO.

QRC: NONE

MISLE: 629326

AY. 091337Z MAR 13: ALL ENTRIES HAVE BEEN VALIDATED BY OS1

AZ. 091535Z MAR 13: HC130H 1702 AIRSTA SACRAMENTO SORTIE ENDED

BA. 091620Z MAR 13: D11 BRIEFED PAC-3 (CAPT FIEDLER ACTING), IRT ASSUMING TACON OF STEADFAST.

BB. 091701Z MAR 13: OS1 B/I SARDO RECIEVED A LINK FROM THE C130 THAT WAS ONSCENE.

[HTTP://CGVI.USCG.MIL/MEDIA/MAIN.PHP?G2_ITEMID=1902687](http://CGVI.USCG.MIL/MEDIA/MAIN.PHP?G2_ITEMID=1902687)

BC. 091733Z MAR 13: CASE VALIDATED BY OS1 (OU).

BD. 131958Z MAR 13: OCS CONTACTED THE (M/E) CORONERS OFFICE REQUESTING INFO REGARDING MR. CRAIG WILLIAMS. CORONER STATED MR. WILLIAMS SUFFERED FROM HYPOTHERMA AND DROWNING AND DEEMED ACCIDENTIAL.

BE. 132100Z MAR 13: RECIEVED AN 406 BEACON LOCATED ON SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND ALMOST IN THE SAME SPOT AS THE ORIGINAL LOCATION OF THE S/V.

BF. 132105Z MAR 13: PLOTTED IN POSITION 3259.87N 11835W (SAN CLEMENTE).

BG. 132109Z MAR 13: RCVD CALL FROM D11 CONCERNING EPIRB GOING OFF ON THE WEST SIDE OF SCI IN POSN 32-59.87N 118-35.0W.

BH. 132112Z MAR 13: CALLED SEC SD IRT EPIRB IN SAN CLEMENTE, ISSUED AN UMIB, AND AN INVESTIGATION WHETHER OR NOT ITS THE SAME AS THE GROUNDED S/V UNCONTROLLABLE URGE.

BI. 132113Z MAR 13: ISSUED UMIB. DIVERTED READY HELO TO WEST SIDE OF SCI.

BJ. 132114Z MAR 13: NOTIFIED CDR CONLEY (SMC) DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF EPIRB BEING FROM VSL UNCONTROLABLE URGE.

BK. 132116Z MAR 13: POSN PLOTS OVER LAND. D11 CALLED CONFIRMS EPIRB IS FROM UNCONTROLABLE URGE.

BL. 132119Z MAR 13: CANX UMIB. RELEASED HELO.

BM. 132120Z MAR 13: SEC SD CONFIRMED THE SAME S/V THAT WAS GROUNDED ON THE ISLAND EARLIER.

BN. 132206Z MAR 13: CASE VALIDATED BY OS1 .

BO. 281943Z MAR 13: GENERATED A 201-SITREP

3. PLANS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Appendix 14: Survey Results

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

What is your boat name and type? (e.g. SCZ 50 Dancer)	
Answer Options	Response Count
	20
<i>answered question</i>	20
<i>skipped question</i>	0

Number	Response Date	Response Text	Categories
1	Jun 3, 2013 5:22 PM	patriot, J44	
2	May 28, 2013 5:54 PM	Holua ULDB 70	
3	May 28, 2013 5:26 PM	Hot Tamale, J/120	
4	May 28, 2013 4:49 PM	Pyewacket, Andrews 68	
5	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM	Aimant de Fille, Beneteau First 36.7	
6	May 28, 2013 3:54 PM	Rocket	
7	May 28, 2013 2:55 PM	SCZ 52 Paranoia	
8	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	J125 Resolute	
9	May 27, 2013 10:47 PM	Dorade 1929 S&S 52' yawl	
10	May 27, 2013 3:10 PM	Pole Dancer, J120	
11	May 26, 2013 8:39 PM	Farr 40 Foil	
12	May 26, 2013 1:15 AM	J120 Adios	
13	May 26, 2013 1:13 AM	scz 70	
14	May 25, 2013 9:07 PM	Santa Cruz 52 Sin Duda!	
15	May 25, 2013 8:57 PM	Grand Illusion SCZ 70	
16	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	Flying Tiger 10M - Mile High Klub	
17	May 25, 2013 8:34 PM	ANDREWS 68, ALCHEMY	
18	May 25, 2013 7:13 PM	SC 50 Adrenalin	
19	May 25, 2013 7:12 PM	J120	
20	May 25, 2013 6:51 PM	SC 70 Warpath	

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Were you monitoring VHF 16?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	65.0%	13
No	35.0%	7
<i>answered question</i>		20
<i>skipped question</i>		0

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Did you hear Uncontrollable Urge call the USCG?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	25.0%	5
No	75.0%	15
What was your response?		6
		<i>answered question</i> 20
		<i>skipped question</i> 0

Number	Response Date	What was your response?	Categories
1	May 28, 2013 4:49 PM	I am not sure whether we were monitoring 16 or the race channel.	
2	May 28, 2013 3:54 PM	We listened to the call and took note of the position in the event we were able to help.	
3	May 28, 2013 2:55 PM	Don't remember	
4	May 27, 2013 10:47 PM	We had someone stand by the VHF to see if they needed help.	
5	May 25, 2013 7:13 PM	I did not hear the initial call, but happened to be at the nav station and heard the conversation between Innocent Merriment and Uncontrollable Urge when they declined assistance from IM. Can't remember specifically, but I recall there was also some conversation between IM and USCG and UU and USCG during the +/- 10 minutes I was listening. Realizing IM's offer was declined and UU was in communication with USCG I only listened and had no response.	
6	May 25, 2013 7:12 PM	i heard the UU conversation with the USCG for a few minutes	

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Where did you experience the most severe conditions of the race?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
West end of Catalina	0.0%	0
West end of San Clemente	60.0%	12
East end of San Clemente	15.0%	3
Between SanClemente and San Diego	25.0%	5
Near the Finish	0.0%	0
What time was this?		13
		<i>answered question</i> 20
		<i>skipped question</i> 0

Number	Response Date	What time was this?	Categories
1	Jun 3, 2013 5:22 PM	10-11pm	
2	May 28, 2013 5:54 PM	Just after dark	
3	May 28, 2013 5:26 PM		06/08/2013
4	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM		06/08/2013
5	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	2100-0300	
6	May 27, 2013 10:47 PM	Between 9pm and midnight	
7	May 26, 2013 8:39 PM	About 7pm	
8	May 26, 2013 1:15 AM	Midnight to 2am	
9	May 26, 2013 1:13 AM	not sure look at the tracker	
10	May 25, 2013 9:07 PM		06/08/2013
11	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	Between 7 PM and 10 PM, not because of wind strength so much as wave angle	
		It's not one of the options, but to me, the most severe conditions were mid way between west end of Catalina and West end San Clemente. I recall we cleared Catalina at +/- 6:30 and got to San Clemente +/- 9:30, so I would estimate our roughest time was around 8:00. Our ride was so bumpy that while I was steering I clipped in because I was concerned about getting bounced off the helm	
12	May 25, 2013 7:13 PM		
13	May 25, 2013 7:12 PM		06/08/2013

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Did your boat have any problems?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	25.0%	5
No	75.0%	15
If yes, please list:		6
		<i>answered question</i> 20
		<i>skipped question</i> 0

Number	Response Date	If yes, please list:	Categories
1	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM	torn headsail, but nothing threatening	
2	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	Torn spinnaker, and one very sea sick crew member	
3	May 27, 2013 10:47 PM	Our VHF was not transmitting - we could receive and at one point we tried to contact them (UU), however we got no response. We weren't aware of the transmit problem until later (next day) when we asked for a radio check and could not be heard.	
4	May 25, 2013 9:07 PM	Broke spinnaker pole during a jibe. Blew out a kite.	
5	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	1. Crew member injured back slipping in the cockpit just before west end of Catalina. 2. Lost stern hung rudder at about 3:30 AM, 30 miles from San Diego finish	
6	May 25, 2013 8:34 PM	BROKEN SPIN POLE	

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

How did you fix the problem(s)?

Answer Options	Response Count
	6
<i>answered question</i>	6
<i>skipped question</i>	14

Number	Response Date	Response Text	Categories
1	May 28, 2013 5:54 PM	NA	
2	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM	took it down	
3	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	Douse torn spinnaker, re-hoist new smaller, prebanded spinnaker	
4	May 25, 2013 9:07 PM	Carbon brace, jury rigged and were able to get the spinnaker back up for the rest of the race.	

5 May 25, 2013 8:39 PM
 6 May 25, 2013 8:34 PM

1. Crew members was kept comfortable below and monitored. 2. Rudder not reparable and sea state would not allow steering by sail trim, Issued call to close-by boats on VHF and began a falshing light signal (did not shoot off a flare) , called SDYC on VHF repeatedly and NO RESPONSE. Then called Coast Guard. Coast Guard was fantastic and I am willing to be interviewed to tell the full story. Eventially got spare rudder brought out to us from another Tiger while we were about 20 miles off Pt Loma. Biggest issues - why didn't boats close aboard offer assistance (4 boats with 1/4 mile of us) and why didn't SDYC respond to VHF transmissions?
 SAIL ON SNOOT LINE.

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Did your boat hit anything or see any flotsam?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	10.0%	2
No	90.0%	18
<i>answered question</i>		20
<i>skipped question</i>		0

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Were your crew members routinely wearing life jackets and/or safety harnesses?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	100.0%	20
No	0.0%	0
List any problems with the life jackets and/or safety harnesses:		4
<i>answered question</i>		20
<i>skipped question</i>		0

Number	Response Date	List any problems with the life jackets and/or safety harnesses:	Categories
1	May 28, 2013 4:49 PM	Always at night or in dangerous conditions	
2	May 28, 2013 2:55 PM	And teathered in	
3	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	Unwanted activation of non-hydrostatic (pill) type PFD	
4	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	No serious issues. With so much water over the beam, bow person auto inflatable vest did inflate accidentally	

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Knowing before the race started that it would be rough and windy, did you take any special precautions?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	78.9%	15
No	21.1%	4
Please list special precautions:		17
<i>answered question</i>		19
<i>skipped question</i>		1

Number	Response Date	Please list special precautions:	Categories
1	Jun 3, 2013 5:22 PM	just went over things as carefully as possibly to make sure all the safety gear was in place and good to go..as well as the boat systems and the like	
2	May 28, 2013 5:26 PM	MOB drill, reef drill, new first aid kit	
3	May 28, 2013 4:49 PM	We made sure we had the right sails(meaning small ones). And all safety gear.	
4	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM	had a safety meeting, directed folks to take anti nausea medication, brought an extra crew member, advised everyone to get life jackets on, directed everyone to put on an extra layer of clothing to prevent hypothermia	
5	May 28, 2013 3:54 PM	Everyone was required to wear life jackets on deck Day or Night!	

6	May 28, 2013 2:55 PM	Knowing the type of race it was, I carried my emergency rudder and life rafts. I must admit I did receive flac from other boats about being rigged for my emergency rudder.
7	May 28, 2013 2:21 AM	Carried emergency rudder system and emergency tiller in the event of primary steering failure.
8	May 27, 2013 10:47 PM	Jack lines run, 2nd reef line run, storm sails checked and stored close at hand, grab bag inventoried to make sure all items were in good working order.
9	May 26, 2013 8:39 PM	Reefing mainsail, heavy weather gear, EIPRB
10	May 26, 2013 1:13 AM	No different then any off shore race. This is just an issue off people not prepping their boat and not having time at sea. Also making decisions to save money on the build of their boat
11	May 25, 2013 9:07 PM	Team meeting about what everyone's jobs were in case of emergency. Pre race briefing about the expected weather.
12	May 25, 2013 8:57 PM	Wearing of harnesses and life jackets mandatory when working on the foredeck.
13	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	Nothing out of the ordinary. Ran Jack Lines and Reef Lines, put life raft aboard and checked Life Sling, checked anchor and rode, brought storm jib, checked for extra life jackets on board, made sure all crew had personal life jackets, tethers, strobes and discussed man overboard procedures
14	May 25, 2013 8:34 PM	EXTRA SAFETY BRIEF TO CREW BEFORE THE START.
15	May 25, 2013 7:13 PM	Not sure what "special" means, but we were rigged with jack lines and all the safety gear (pfd's with strobes, whistles, glow sticks) along with having ditch bag at the ready, which was the race's category requirement.
16	May 25, 2013 7:12 PM	made sure reefing gear was rigged
17	May 25, 2013 6:51 PM	Before leaving the dock we held a team briefing on operation of safety equipment and discussed safety procedures in case of an accident.

2013 Islands Race Skipper Questionnaire

Did you ever consider dropping out of the race?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	15.0%	3
No	85.0%	17
If yes, when and for what reason(s):		2
		<i>answered question</i>
		20
		<i>skipped question</i>
		0

Number	Response Date	If yes, when and for what reason(s):	Categories
1	May 28, 2013 4:07 PM	a bit after the west end of Catalina, as the sun was setting it was clear this would be a rough ride. we had a crew meeting, and discussed turning into the Isthmus. Everyone decided we'd rather press on.	
2	May 25, 2013 8:39 PM	Briefly consider it to tend to injured crew before West End of Catalina; but crew seemed comfortable with no life-threatening injuries so we pushed on	

Appendix 15: Interview with Phillip Infelise, Owner/Skipper of *Mile High Klub*

Mile High Klub Interview

With Owner/Skipper Phillip Infelise

June 28, 2013

By John Jourdane and Dave Ullman

Mile High Klub is Flying Tiger 10M, designed by Bob Perry, and built in China. Like *Uncontrollable Urge*, *Mile High Klub* lost her rudder during the 2013 Islands Race. Both boats were about the same size, and had about the same rating. Phillip described his experience.

It was blustery before the Start, but then the wind died to very light by the first warning. The wind steadily built on the beat from Long Beach to Catalina Island. *Uncontrollable Urge* had a bad start, was quite far behind, and made landfall below the Catalina Island Isthmus. The wind increased as *Mile High Klub* approached west end of Catalina Island. One of *Mile High Klub's* crewmen slipped, fell, and injured his back during a tack. The crew put him below in a bunk, where he stayed for the rest of the race.

As they sailed from Catalina Island to San Clemente Island, the wind was 25-28 knots with 10-12 foot seas on the beam. The sea state was quite confused on the windward side of San Clemente Island. They rounded the

island and headed for the finish off Point Loma. At 0330, while beam reaching in 25 knots of wind, the rudder broke.

Mile High Klub has a transom-hung rudder held in place by gudgeons and pintles. The pintles had become detached from the rudder blade. It was very windy with confused seas, and *Mile High Klub* had no emergency rudder. The boat was approximately 30 miles from Point Loma.

The crew did not hear the radio transmissions from *Uncontrollable Urge*. They could see the lights of three boats that were near them, and they tried calling for help on the VHF, but no one responded. They tried calling the Race Committee, but got no response. They finally called the USCG on VHF, and told them of their problem, and that they had an injured crewman.

Luckily the USCG had a cutter on its way to Central America, and it was underway near Point Loma. The cutter came to their position, and lowered an inflatable with a medic. They tended to the injured crewman, and brought hot breakfast of eggs and bacon to the crew of *Mile High Klub*. The USCG offered to take the crew off *Mile High Klub*, and back to San Diego, but they decided to decline the offer, and stay with the boat.

Phillip called Southwestern Yacht Club, and was able to borrow a Flying Tiger rudder from another boat. Someone from the yacht club offered to bring it out to them in a power boat. Once the new rudder was installed, the USCG followed them into Southwestern Yacht Club. Fortunately, the current was flowing toward San Diego, and from the time they lost the rudder at 0330 to the time they had the new rudder in at 0900 they had drifted about 10 miles closer to Point Loma.

Conclusion:

The crewman's injury turned out to not be serious, and he is fully recovered.

Phillip had a new, stronger rudder built by Jim Betts, along with a strong emergency rudder cassette and blade.

He feels the Islands Race should be OSR Category 2 instead of OSR Category 3 w/ Life Raft.

He also feels all OSR Category 2, 1 and 0 races should require a real emergency rudder, not just an "alternative method of steering."